Chinese firms and employment dynamics in Africa: A comparative analysis. IDCEA Synthesis Report by Oya, Carlos & Schaefer, Florian
Chinese firms 
and employment 
dynamics in Africa: 
A comparative analysis
Synthesis Report
Carlos Oya (SOAS, University of London) 
Florian Schaefer (London School of Economics)
Acknowledgements
We are greatly indebted to our field teams in both 
countries for their hard work and dedication. Our 
field team in Ethiopia consisted of Alemayehu 
Hussein, Eyob Alemayehu, Mihretu Aberra, Tesfay 
Bulto, Yordanos Fisseha, and Zelalem Wakjira. The 
team was led by Fekadu Yeshitila and Hailu Bekele. 
Haileyesus Andualem, Yichun Li, and Ma Jie managed 
and coordinated the field research. In Angola, the field 
team was led by Martins Bota and Manico Simão, and 
included as interviewers Galdino Campembe, João 
Catala, Imaculada Florindo, Edson M. P. José, José 
de Lima Manuel and Sabrita Augusto Velasco. Their 
professionalism, commitment to learn and dedication 
were exceptional.
This research would not have been possible without 
the institutional support and coordination provided by 
the Ethiopian Economics Association, especially Assefa 
Admassie, Amin Abdella, and Asfaw Sisay, and the 
Forum for Social Studies, especially Meheret Ayenew, 
Leulseged Lemma, and Tigist Negussie. Research in 
Angola was also possible thanks to the partnerships 
with Faculdade de Economia of Agostinho Neto 
University (FECUAN) and JMJ-Angola. 
We would like to thank the various institutions that 
provided vital support for the viability of the field 
research. In Ethiopia the Ethiopian Investment 
Commission, the Ministry of Industry, the Ethiopian 
Road Authority, the Office of the President of Oromia, 
the Office of the President of SNNPR, the Ethiopian 
Leather Industry Development Institute, the Ethiopian 
Textile Industry Development Institute, and the 
Ethiopian Confederation of Trade Unions all provided 
support and encouragement in different phases of the 
project. In Angola, government departments were also 
highly supportive and facilitated the access needed 
to conduct surveys within workplace premises. In 
particular we would like to acknowledge the support 
provided by Ministry of Construction, especially the 
Road Authority (INEA), the Ministry of Industry and 
GAMEK (in charge of the hydropower dam project).
We are grateful to the various companies which 
opened their doors to our field team and granted 
their time to answer our questions. Last, but by no 
means least, we thank the hundreds of workers who 
patiently responded to our questions and shared their 
experiences with us.
Research partners: SOAS, University of London; 
FECUAN (Agostinho Neto University), Ethiopian 
Economics Association; Forum for Social Studies; 
Renmin University.
Photos by: Davide Scalenghe 2019
Funding body: Economic and Social Research Council 
and UKAid (United Kingdom)
Oya, C. and Schaefer, F., 2019. Chinese firms and employment dynamics in Africa: A comparative analysis. IDCEA Research 
Synthesis Report, SOAS, University of London.
This report was compiled by Carlos Oya and Florian Schaefer, and benefited from 
the contributions of various researchers participating in the IDCEA project during 
the inception phase, data collection and data analysis. In particular we would like to 
acknowledge the contributions of Tang Xiaoyang, Fernandes Wanda, Dic Lo, Hao Qi, 
Sam-Kee Cheng, Âurea Mouzinho, Lucile Franchet, and Sarah Graf. Special thanks go to 
Christina Wolf for her vital role in developing the project. Terry McKinley has also played 
an important role in developing impact plans and helping deliver on them. Weiwei Chen 
played a key role in all stages of the project, especially in the process of facilitating work 
with Chinese firms. Our peer advisory group, including Ching Kwan Lee, Lucy Corkin 
and Pedro Martins, also provided very valuable feedback and advice.
Contents
Oya, C. and Schaefer, F., 2019. Chinese firms and employment dynamics in Africa: A comparative analysis. IDCEA Research 




1 Introduction: manufacturing and construction 7 
growing in Africa 
2 Research questions and analytical framework 10
3 What do we know from existing literature and data? 14
 3.1 Workforce localization: do Chinese firms rely on Chinese labour? 14
 3.2 Working conditions 17
 3.3 Skill development 20
 3.4 Summary 21
4 How did we approach the questions? Research design 22
 4.1 Sampling process and outcomes 24
 4.2 Firm characteristics 26
5 Angola and Ethiopia: different patterns of growth 29
6 Do Chinese firms hire local workers? Myths and realities 34 
on workforce localization 
7 Labour force segmentation: who are the workers? 37
 7.1 Angola: labour force characteristics and segmentation 37
 7.2 Ethiopia: labour force characteristics and segmentation 41
8 Labour outcomes: wages and working conditions 44 
in comparative perspective 
 8.1 Job security and formality 44
 8.2 Wages 46
 8.2.1 Wages in Angola 46
 8.2.2 Wages in Ethiopia 50
 8.2.3 Wages and living costs in Angola 52
 8.2.4 Wages and living costs in Ethiopia 54
 8.3 Non-wage working conditions 55
 8.3.1 Non-wage working conditions in Angola 55
 8.3.2 Non-wage working conditions in Ethiopia 57
 8.4 Labour relations, conflict and institutions 58
 8.4.1 Management-worker interactions 60
 8.5 Training and skill development 61
 8.5.1 Training provision in Angola 61
 8.5.2 Training provision in Ethiopia 62
9 Conclusions and summary of main findings 64
References  66
Appendix A – Table A1. Workforce localization rates in SSA 69
Appendix B – Regression results 70
Chinese firms and employment dynamics in Africa: A comparative analysis. IDCEA Research Synthesis Report4
Acronyms
AGOA African Growth and Opportunity Act
CSA Central Statistical Agency
EIC Ethiopian Investment Commission
EIZ Eastern Industrial Zone
ETB Ethiopian birr
FDI  Foreign direct investment
ILO International Labour Organisation
OF Other Foreign




This report presents the synthesis of the main findings 
of the Industrial development, construction and 
employment in Africa (IDCEA) research project. This 
research project www.soas.ac.u.uk/idcea set out to 
explore comparative evidence on working conditions 
in emerging construction and manufacturing sectors 
in Africa. The initial aim was to probe widespread 
perceptions in media and by some commentators 
that Chinese firms tend to rely on Chinese expat 
labour, that working conditions in Chinese firms are 
poor, and that their contribution to training is limited. 
The study challenges these popular perceptions 
through an extensive desk review and a combination 
of quantitative and qualitative methods to gather 
detailed comparative evidence. An additional aim 
of the study was to analyse the characteristics of 
an emerging industrial workforce in countries with 
different economic growth patterns. Ethiopia and 
Angola provide two useful contrasting contexts for 
these questions.
The findings are based on 4 years of fieldwork-
intensive research on employment patterns and 
outcomes in the infrastructure construction and 
manufacturing sectors in Angola and Ethiopia, 
where large-scale surveys of workers and extensive 
qualitative research were conducted between 2016 
and 2018. The research concentrates on two sectors 
where the employment contributions of foreign, 
including Chinese, firms are particularly important: 
manufacturing and construction (for the latter, 
specifically in road infrastructure). 
We adopted a research design based on a sequential 
mixed methods approach that was operationalised 
through a carefully designed comparative framework. 
An international research team completed extensive 
qualitative scoping research, desk reviews and two 
large-scale surveys of workers in Ethiopia (837 
workers) and Angola (682) in March-August 2017 
and September 2016-March 2017 respectively. These 
workers were distributed in 37 firms in Angola and 
40 companies in Ethiopia, roughly half of them 
being of Chinese origin. Qualitative data collection 
continued until July 2018, firm management surveys 
were completed in 2018, and subsequently additional 
longitudinal data were collected through phone 
surveys in late 2018 and early 2019. The approach 
was to compare like with like as much as possible, 
selecting all the leading Chinese, other foreign, and 
domestic firms within specific and highly relevant 
sub-sectors. In other words, we compared workers in 
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leading Chinese firms with the best of the rest,  
not with the average. 
Overall the project shows that national, 
sector and economic context are more 
important in understanding labour 
conditions in Africa than the country 
origin of the firm itself. 
On the question of job creation and the proportion 
of national (Ethiopian and Angolan) workers in the 
labour force we find that workforce localization 
rates are substantially higher than usually assumed 
in media perceptions. In Ethiopia these rates 
were 90% of all workers (and 100% for low-skilled 
workers) and in Angola, where rates are usually 
much lower due to skill shortages, estimated rates 
were 74%. In Angola we found that localization 
had grown significantly in the previous 10 years as 
Chinese firms settled in that market context. Given 
that Chinese contractors have dominated the road 
construction market in Ethiopia and Angola, they 
have been the main contributors to job creation in 
absolute terms, especially in recent years. 
Different sectors and firms employ heterogeneous 
workforces. In both countries we found evidence 
of significant labour force segmentation, especially 
in Angola, where we could distinguish between two 
clear segments: a) poorer migrant workers with lower 
education levels and much less relevant sector work 
experience dominate the workforces in many Chinese 
firms in both construction and manufacturing; b) a 
relatively higher-skilled segment of workers, with 
education levels above the average urban worker, 
and more work experience in construction and 
manufacturing, who are older and enjoy more stable 
work arrangements, is concentrated in Angolan and 
other foreign firms, especially in Angolan factories in 
Luanda and firms operating in a major dam project. 
These segments reflect the different employment 
dynamics in Chinese firms that on average entered 
the Angolan market only 10 years ago in contrast with 
Angolan and other foreign firms that have a more 
consolidated position in the country. They also reflect 
the reaction of Chinese managers to the perceived 
lack of discipline and reliability of Luanda-based 
workers, which encourages them to effectively set 
up a ‘dormitory labour regime’, to improve labour 
control, as it is also common in many parts of 
China. Perhaps more striking is the fact that this 
kind of practice is rare in Ethiopia, where only few 
Chinese firms opt to have worker dormitories, 
while other foreign companies appear to be 
contemplating this option as a way of combatting 
high labour turnover. In both countries the presence 
of migrant labour is, however, conspicuous, 
especially in manufacturing firms. 
Segmentation among Ethiopian workers has 
different characteristics. Among the low-skilled 
workers, employees of Ethiopian companies are 
much older than workers in Chinese or other 
foreign-owned firms, where workers are very 
close to one another in average age and also have 
markedly lower levels of education. While women 
form the majority of the low-skilled labour force 
across all company types, this is most pronounced 
in other foreign firms, including Chinese firms. 
Factory work is highly gendered in Ethiopia, with 
dominance of women workers especially in textile, 
garment and shoe factories, whereas Angolan 
factories producing building materials are entirely 
male-dominated. Sector and country matter a lot in 
defining the patterns of segmentation. 
In order to explore working conditions, we first 
compared take-home wages for workers by skill-
group (low-skilled and semi-skilled) and by sector 
across different firms by origin. A combination of 
descriptive and statistical regression analysis reveals 
that there is significant variation in wages and that 
the main determinants are, for Ethiopia: skill level of 
workers; working in construction (higher wages); job 
tenure; education; work experience; socio-economic 
status and location, like being located in an industrial 
park, where wages are slightly lower. In Angola the 
main determinants of wages are: skill level of workers; 
job tenure; work experience; socio-economic status; 
specific location effects; and an indicator of sample 
bias. Once we take all these factors into account 
the origin of a firm does not impact on wages on 
average. In other words, wages in sampled Chinese 
firms were broadly similar to other top firms in the 
same sectors, once other worker and company 
characteristics are taken into account. An interesting 
finding is that in Angola many Chinese firms adopt 
a migrant ‘dormitory labour regime’ by employing 
relatively poorer workers from the Centre-South of 
the country, where employment opportunities are 
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scarce. Therefore, these workers also obtained food 
and accommodation and managed to save more from 
their wages than workers employed in other firms, 
especially in Luanda, where living costs are high. 
While firms benefited from the weaker bargaining 
power of these workers it is also true that they offered 
more stable and better paid jobs to poorer labour 
market entrants in Angola.
Reported wages are not ‘poverty wages’ in the 
strict sense. In Angola and Ethiopia, even the lowest-
paid low skilled workers receive wages that are above 
the extreme and moderate international poverty lines. 
In Angola, all workers earn wages that are above the 
sector minimum wage and a majority of workers earn 
well above minimum wages. However, most workers 
complained that their wages were too low when 
compared with relatively high living costs, especially 
for migrants who had to face high housing and food 
costs in those cases where accommodation and food 
were not provided by employers.
Sector specificities and country context are also 
crucial to understand differences in the non-wage 
benefits workers obtain, which vary substantially, 
as well as the degree of ‘formality’ in labour 
arrangements. What was common to both countries 
was the absence of labour intermediaries and 
complex labour recruitment systems. In Angola, 
Chinese firms are more likely to offer free food and 
accommodation whereas other firms reflect more 
formalization in labour arrangements through higher 
incidence of benefits like sick leave, holidays, and 
medical assistance. In Ethiopia the differences are 
less systematic but both Chinese and other foreign 
employers are mwore likely to offer meals in factory 
sites. Occupational hazard, especially reported injuries 
and work accidents are broadly similar across firms by 
origin, although more common in construction sites 
and less common in Chinese firms.
We find evidence that in Ethiopia 
sampled Chinese firms contribute to 
training and skill development at least 
as much as other firms in the same 
sector, but it is in the manufacturing 
sector where training is widespread 
and considered as much more 
necessary by firms. 
In Angola, all firms have to provide different forms 
of informal on-the-job training given the severe 
skill shortages in the country especially for workers 
lacking relevant experience and education, but 
national firms and some foreign firms tend to 
have some more formal types of initial induction 
training. In any case, the contribution to skill 
upgrading, whether through formal or informal 
means, is beyond doubt, especially for workers with 
very limited prior experience in these sectors.
In relation to labour relations at the workplace 
we find evidence that generally leading national 
firms are more used to having trade union 
presence, whereas foreign firms, including Chinese 
companies, are more reluctant to engage with 
unions and tend to adopt different management 
styles. However, we also found that there was no 
difference in the level of labour conflict across 
firms in both countries as all kinds of firms were 
similarly affected by strikes over wages, especially 
in the Ethiopian manufacturing sector. Labour 
conflict is not only manifested in strikes and tense 
encounters at the workplace. It is also reflected in 
forms of passive resistance such as absenteeism 
and theft, which was reported to be common in 
Angola but not in Ethiopia. Instances of abuse by 
managers and supervisors, more widely reported in 
Ethiopia, and poor communication, a feature found 
in both countries, reflect some of these workplace 
struggles. There is also a clash of expectations 
between an emerging industrial working class 
with aspirations of well-paid and stable jobs, and 
new investors in search of a low-cost and docile 
labour force. The weakness of labour institutions 
in both Angola and Ethiopia and especially the 
lack of a sector-relevant minimum wage in 
Ethiopia contribute to some of these tensions at  
the workplace. 
Understanding labour outcomes and employment 
dynamics in the emerging construction and 
manufacturing sectors in African countries requires 
a careful analysis of a multi-layered configuration 
of labour regimes. Overall, the study shows that 
context, both national and sector contexts, as 
well as the circumstances of the economies and 
countries when surveys were conducted, are more 
important determinants of labour outcomes and 
labour relations than the origin of a firm.
Chinese firms and employment dynamics in Africa: A comparative analysis. IDCEA Research Synthesis Report 7
1 Introduction: manufacturing and 
construction growing in Africa
Emerging economies in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA, 
or Africa hereafter) have experienced accelerated 
growth and – varying degrees of – structural change 
in recent years, especially since the early 2000s. In 
some countries, such as Ethiopia, growth has been 
resilient, even during the post-2008 global recession. 
Ethiopia has been a hub for foreign direct investment 
(FDI) into the manufacturing sector for the past ten 
years and is seen today as the leading example of a 
new industrialization drive in Africa. Angola, on the 
other hand, is growing rapidly on the back of years a 
commodity boom and high oil prices, combined with 
the peace dividend of the postwar reconstruction 
effort since 2002. 
However, prevailing employment 
structures in Africa are still 
characterised by a lack of higher-
productivity jobs and a reliance on low-
productivity agricultural and ‘informal’ 
service activities, with relatively high 
unemployment rates in large urban 
centres, improvements since the 
1990s notwithstanding. 
Limited structural change and industrialization in most 
of SSA are reflected in substantial underemployment 
in rural areas and low-return informal jobs. Therefore, 
accelerated growth in infrastructure development 
and higher productivity manufacturing are important 
aspirations for many African countries. Ethiopia, for 
example, has translated those aspirations into an 
ambitious industrial strategy, aimed at generating 
manufacturing jobs through a combination of state-
led investment in infrastructure and FDI-driven growth 
in the export-oriented manufacturing sector. Angola, 
on the other hand, has focused on rebuilding after 
decades of war and has only recently begun a slow 
process of economic diversification in order to reduce 
its oil dependence and attenuate associated risks, 
which were illustrated by the economic crisis that hit 
the country in 2015-17.
In this context China’s economic engagement 
in Africa is attracting widespread attention, and 
has generated debates across the continent, and 
beyond, about the implications for Africa’s economic 
development. An optimistic view sees Chinese 
engagement as an act of South-South solidarity, 
which offers African countries the opportunity 
to create jobs, increase trade, and expand their 
manufacturing capabilities, or at least as a sound 
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business opportunity likely to generate benefits for 
both Africans and their Chinese partners. By contrast, 
a more pessimistic view paints China as a rising 
imperial power seeking to use its newfound economic 
clout to exploit African resources and workers for its 
own benefit. Regardless of the interpretation, Chinese 
investments and construction activities have grown 
rapidly in recent years. 
Understanding the emergence of Chinese actors 
in African countries, especially of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and private firms in construction 
and manufacturing, requires an understanding of 
the contextual dynamics of transformation and rapid 
growth that have shaped the phenomenon of China’s 
‘going out’ (zou chu qu), since the early 2000s (Lo, 
2018; CICCPS, 2016). There are important shifts in 
the pattern of growth and development strategies 
in China towards a ‘new normal’ that should see a 
greater role for domestic demand, innovation, and the 
globalization of Chinese firms. Meanwhile, there are 
also important labour market trends that are changing 
the prevailing labour regimes in China, driven by 
rapid wage growth above productivity growth since 
the early 2000s (Lo, 2018), more significant labour 
militancy, and greater government concern for the 
welfare of workers (Xu and Chen, 2019; Luthje et 
al., 2013). These labour market trends are shaping 
the nature of ‘going out’ processes among different 
varieties of state and private capital in China, and 
driving the dynamics of expansion and relocation of 
low-wage productive segments overseas, including 
towards Africa.  Therefore, the globalization of 
Chinese firms has implications for developing 
countries, which are a primary destination of their 
productive investments and construction services.
In 2017, Africa represented 30% of total overseas 
revenues for Chinese infrastructure contractors, up 
from 13% in 2000 (SAIS-CARI, 2019). In the same 
year, 60% of the contract revenues of the top 250 
international construction contractors in Africa was 
accounted for by Chinese firms, up from 15% in 
2004 (Wolf and Cheng, 2018). In a prominent report 
McKinsey (2017) estimated that over a thousand 
Chinese firms involved in construction and real estate 
represent nearly 50% of African markets. Chinese FDI 
flows to SSA has continued to expand and between 
2012 and 2017 Chinese FDI stock to SSA doubled from 
around $20bn to nearly $40bn (SAIS-CARI database). 
The McKinsey report (2017: 30) estimated that there 
are 10,000 Chinese firms operating in Africa, most 
of which are private enterprises. Of these firms 31% 
are in manufacturing, 25% in services, 22% in trade 
and 15% in construction and real estate. According 
to SAIS-CARI data, the share of manufacturing in 
the Chinese FDI stock in Africa is around 14%, but 
the Chinese share in the number of projects (rather 
than the volume of investment) is significantly higher 
(Shen, 2015). 
Angola and Ethiopia were selected for this study for 
two main reasons. First, both feature among the 
most important markets for Chinese contractors in 
infrastructure building in Africa, as well as among 
the top recipients of Chinese FDI and Chinese 
official finance. Second, they are different contexts 
of Chinese engagement in terms of their political 
economy, employment dynamics and industrial 
development. Therefore they offer a significant 
contrast that is useful for analytical and empirical 
purposes. Angola is the top recipient of Chinese 
official loans in Africa in the period 2000-17 with 30% 
of total value of loans, followed by Ethiopia with 10%. 
As a result, both countries are at the top in terms of 
shares of Chinese infrastructure contract revenues 
in Africa, with roughly 14% each on average in the 
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2012-17 period. Angola reached a peak of 26% of 
Chinese contractor revenues in Africa in 2009, when 
the country was enjoying an oil and infrastructural 
bonanza (calculations based on data from SAIS-CARI 
database). According to the same sources, Chinese 
FDI to Angola grew rapidly in the 2014-17 period, 
with construction and mining receiving the lion’s 
share (around 25-30% each). In Ethiopia. Chinese FDI 
stocks doubled between 2014 and 2017, to over $2bn, 
representing 5% of total Chinese FDI stock to SSA 
(calculations based on data from SAIS-CARI database). 
Moreover, in Ethiopia a large proportion of Chinese 
private investment has gone to manufacturing, unlike 
in other African countries. 
However, the available evidence on 
employment patterns and outcomes 
associated with Chinese firms in 
Africa is limited. 
While there is a heated debate about wages and 
working conditions in Chinese companies 
operating in the continent (Jenkins, 2019; Baah 
and Jauch, 2009; HRW, 2011; Sautman and Yan, 
2011), the available literature on these issues has 
a number of limitations. First, there is not enough 
evidence comparing conditions in Chinese 
firms to those in other companies. Second, we 
lack quantitative evidence for large samples of 
randomly selected workers across different firms. 
Third, we need more integrated qualitative and 
quantitative evidence, aimed at explaining not only 
outcomes but also reasons for such outcomes. 
This report focuses on the main findings of the 
first comparative quantitative surveys conducted 
in African countries with large samples of workers 
employed by domestic and foreign (including 
Chinese) firms in infrastructure construction and 
manufacturing. The synthesis brings new evidence 
on patterns of workforce localization (i.e. reliance 
on national African workers), the characteristics 
of the emerging labour forces in construction 
and manufacturing, wages, non-wage working 
conditions, patterns of skill development and 
workplace labour relations. The report does not 
provide an exhaustive inventory of the evidence 
collected for this project, as there are other outputs 
dealing with different aspects and more in-depth 
analysis at country level. The aim is to bring the 
survey results from Ethiopia and Angola together, 
highlighting some common patterns as well as a 
range of differences. 
The remainder of the report is structured as follows. 
Section 2 summarizes the research questions and 
analytical framework informing the design and 
analysis of this research. In Section 2 we review the 
available literature and evidence before Section 3 
provides an overview of the research design and main 
sample and firm characteristics. Section 4 introduces 
the political economy of the national contexts of 
Angola and Ethiopia, where workers’ and firm surveys 
were conducted. This is followed by an analysis 
of comparative evidence on the characteristics of 
workers by sector, skill level and origin of firms, and 
the patterns of segmentation found in each context 
in Section 6. The analysis of working conditions, in 
their different dimensions (wages, benefits, working 
hours, security), is the focus of Section 7, which 
also presents some of the most salient findings with 
regards to labour relations and management-worker 
interactions, as well as training. Section 8 concludes 
with a summary of main results.
2 Research questions 
and analytical framework
This study focuses on the dynamics of employment creation in the emerging sectors 
of infrastructure building and manufacturing, and particularly on the employment 
conditions found therein.
Research Question 1
What are the patterns and determinants 
of job creation (and labour localization) in 
manufacturing and infrastructure development 
in Sub-Saharan Africa and specifically in Ethiopia 
and Angola?
The focus is on direct job creation. While 
indirect and induced job creation are also 
clearly important to understand contributions 
to employment, the scope of this project 
could not extend to such ambitious aims. This 
question focuses particularly on the balance 
between the use of local/national and expatriate 
labour and the conditions that shape variations 
in job creation across sectors and firms and 
over time. A subsidiary question is whether 
workforce localization rates in Chinese firms are 
significantly different than other firms and why.
Research Question 2
What are the extrinsic (objective) working 
conditions in the leading firms of the 
infrastructure construction and manufacturing 
sectors in Angola and Ethiopia? 
This is the main focus of the research. We focus 
in particular on the range of factors affecting 
variation in wages, as well as the nature of labour 
regimes in different sectors and for different 
firms. Given the interest in comparisons among 
firms of different origin, we analyse contrasting 
results between Chinese, national and other 
foreign firms. 
This section presents the main research questions and the core analytical framework, 
with an emphasis on the need to transcend ‘methodological nationalism’ inherent in 
some of the literature on working conditions in Chinese firms in Africa, in the attempt 
to understand variations in working conditions as well as the drivers of job creation, in 
light of the combined effects of a wide range of factors at global, national and local 
level, beyond – but obviously not excluding – firm origin.
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Research Question 3
 To what extent and how do foreign and domestic 
companies contribute to skill development for 
African workers in these sectors? 
Linked to the question on working conditions, 
particular attention is given to the incidence, 
patterns and variation in processes of skill 
development as well as how firms, especially 
foreign companies, deal with skill shortages 
in emerging non-agricultural sectors. Skill 
development and better working conditions are 
linked to social upgrading of African workers and 
this study provides evidence on these aspects.
Research Question 4
What are the characteristics of the emerging 
non-agricultural workforce and their implications 
for future structural transformations? 
We are interested in the long and uneven process 
of building an industrial labour force. The study 
aims to provide emerging profiles of workers 
in sectors that are expected to generate a 
significant number of jobs and draw labour from 
low-productivity sectors, especially agriculture. 
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To answer these questions we adopt an analytical 
framework that builds on different strands of 
literature spanning the following topics: (a) labour 
process theory and labour regimes in contemporary 
capitalism; (b) the geography of global value 
chains and production networks, and the new 
international division of labour configurations; (c) 
the effects of FDI on employment outcomes and 
skill development; and (d) the role of Chinese firms 
in the dynamics of structural transformation and 
employment creation in Africa.
Based on insights from these different conceptual 
traditions, our analytical framework combines 
three different and interconnected levels of 
analysis to explain the multiple determinants of 
labour outcomes in a given context (see Figure 
1). Variants of this multi-scalar approach have 
been deployed in recent research on local labour 
regimes, labour standards and competitive 
pressures in global value chains (Smith et al., 2018; 
Baglioni, 2018).









The 'macro': economic dynamics, balance 
of class forces and broader politics of 
production, including labour institutions and 
government policy  imperatives  
 
The regional / local: local labour markets 
and regional/local politics 
Market structures, global production 
network rules and pressures, types of firms 
relocating, business cycles, and 
technology  
Labour process organisation 
 
‘Raw’ encounters over wage bargaining, 
productivity and work intensity, workplace 
safety, and fringe benefits  
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First, beginning at the bottom, are the micro-level 
workplace dynamics and ‘raw’ encounters between 
employers and workers over wages, productivity 
imperatives, safety, effort, and labour time. The 
theoretical framework we draw on in our explanation 
in based on the notion of labour regimes, i.e. “the 
interrelations of (segmented) labour markets and 
recruitment, conditions of employment and labour 
processes, and forms of enterprise authority and 
control, when they coalesce in sociologically well-
defined clusters with their own discernible ‘logic’ 
and effects” (Bernstein, 2007: 7). In addition, labour 
regimes incorporate the institutions of social 
reproduction which, taken together, ensure that 
workers can be mobilised, motivated, utilised in 
production, and reproduced (Taylor and Rioux, 2018). 
Second are the characteristics and dynamics of 
a particular sector or global production network, 
which cut across national boundaries and generate 
specific imperatives of labour control and standards, 
through market structures, competition, global chain 
rules, and technology, and which are intimately 
linked with skill requirements, the spatial dimensions 
of labour processes, and even prevailing work 
culture and management ethos (Anner, 2015). 
Integration into sophisticated global production 
networks serving consumer markets in high-income 
countries is different to ‘simply’ exporting goods. 
While all exporting companies are exposed to the 
‘disciplining’ effects of international markets, the 
pressures they face are very different to those found 
in the global production networks that produce 
relatively high-quality goods for sale in the US and 
EU. These networks are organised and controlled 
by powerful and demanding lead companies that 
impose rapid turnaround times and low profit margins 
on their suppliers. For suppliers tied into such global 
production networks these pressures result in a very 
different organisation of the labour process, by which 
we mean the conversation of labour power, which is 
a person’s capacity to work over a given time period, 
into realised work (Taylor and Rioux, 2018). A priori, 
we expect labour processes in companies tied into 
global production networks to be subject to much 
more detailed managerial interference, and managers 
to rely on more sophisticated – and often harsher – 
labour control regimes.
Third is the national political economy, and 
particularly the macroeconomic dynamics shaping 
economic transformations and structural change 
alongside the macro-level politics of production and 
state–society relations which shape labour supply 
dynamics and the arenas of different struggles, 
whether over the extent of commodification, 
the limits to labour reproduction, or claims over 
representation. In this case, the national-level 
politics of production in terms of the relations 
between state, capital, and labour, as well as the 
institutions that underpin these relations are critical 
to understanding labour outcomes in any given 
sector across countries (Lee 2017; Anner 2015). 
Through this analytical lens, it is possible to explore 
the combination of a wide range of factors in 
determining labour standards for a particular firm 
and sector. 
Considering such a variety of factors is necessary 
to avoid methodological determinism when 
particular issues are in focus, such as the nationality 
of firms, the country of operation or the global 
value chain. Much of the early literature on Chinese 
firms in Africa has focused on the labour practices 
in these firms as if they were unique, culturally 
driven, and detached from the economic realities 
and imperatives of the sectors and labour markets 
they are part of. There are already some important 
contributions that have questioned the ‘Chinese 
exceptionalism’ in labour studies in other contexts 
(Chan, 2015).
The variety of labour regimes 
present in China across sectors, 
varieties of capital, and locations, 
should question the validity of 
narratives of ‘Chinese labour 
practices’ (Luthje et al, 2013).
The specific combinations of factors considered 
in this multi-scalar labour regime configuration 
constitute a framework where the origin of a firm is 
just one of many determinants. Moreover, firm origin 
is likely to be associated with other sector, firm and 
contextual attributes, which together account for 
variation in wages and other working conditions.
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3 What do we know from existing 
literature and data?
Before we lay out the findings of our own empirical 
work we present a review of key published sources 
and data that have contributed to the debate on 
labour issues in relation to Chinese firms in Africa. The 
literature on these questions, albeit limited, has grown 
rapidly in the past ten years, but there is still excessive 
reliance on media sources and anecdotal evidence.
While China is seen as a popular partner for African 
countries, primarily because of its contribution to 
infrastructure development,1 Chinese employers do 
not enjoy the same popularity (Sun, 2017). Although 
the literature on labour-market effects of Chinese 
firms in Africa is still in its infancy, there are three 
types of common claims and perceptions that are 
often found in media reports, some academic 
publications, and indeed when interviewing different 
kinds of respondents in business and government 
settings. First is the claim that Chinese firms mostly 
or often employ large numbers of Chinese workers 
in positions that should be filled by African workers. 
In other words, Chinese firms allegedly have 
particularly low rates of labour force localization. 
Second, it is often reported that working conditions 
are sub-standard and especially exploitative in 
Chinese firms in Africa. Third, the limited localization 
is compounded by very limited efforts to develop 
the skills of local workers. This section will discuss 
each of these claims in turn and compare with the 
best available evidence.
3.1 Workforce localization: do Chinese firms rely on Chinese labour?
1 https://edition.cnn.com/2016/11/03/africa/what-africans-really-think-of-china/index.html 
Given the pervasive underemployment in most African 
countries and significant unemployment especially 
in Southern Africa, foreign investors and contractors 
are expected to make important contributions to job 
creation. However, there is a perception, especially 
common in media reporting, that Chinese firms rely 
on Chinese labour and make only limited use of 
local labour (French, 2014).2 At one extreme of this 
widespread narrative are lurid stories about the alleged 
use of Chinese prison labour in Chinese construction 
sites in Africa.3 This kind of story continues to be 
reproduced by journalists and even researchers (see 
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Sautman and Yan, 2016, for some examples). Such 
rumours are now fortunately more widely questioned 
thanks to the growing availability of evidence to 
the contrary,4 even if such claims persist among 
uninformed commentators, firm managers, journalists, 
and even some African government officials, as we 
encountered in our own research in Angola and 
Ethiopia in 2016–17. 
Claims of uniquely low localization rates in Chinese 
enterprises are sometimes bolstered by selectively 
reporting statistics on the number of Chinese workers 
in Africa. One oft-cited statistic claims there are ‘one 
million Chinese workers in Africa’ (French 2014). 
However, we now have a more accurate idea of 
numbers thanks to more reliable statistics compiled 
by SAIS-CARI. These do show a marked increase 
in Chinese expat labour between 2001 (nearly 
47,000 workers) and 2016 (227,000 workers) with a 
peak of over 263,000 in 2015. These numbers may 
underestimate the true figures, as not all migrants are 
registered, but are more likely to be close to realities 
of Chinese labour in construction projects and other 
formal arrangements. The proportion of Chinese 
workers in the sub-Saharan part of Africa has been 
steadily declining from a peak of 78% in 2011 to only 
58% in 2016, so that North Africa now is home to a 
disproportionate share of Chinese workers and lower 
levels of localization. In absolute terms, after years of 
growth, the number of registered Chinese workers in 
SSA declined by nearly 20% between 2015 and 2017, a 
sign that workforce localization has been gaining force 
both in absolute and relative terms.5 Given the stable 
pattern of trends in the presence of Chinese workers 
in the continent between 2009 and 2016, combined 
with the rapid increase in Chinese FDI and construction 
projects (Wolf and Cheng, 2018) which allows us to 
safely assume a similar or higher rate of growth in total 
job creation, most of the expansion in employment 
during that period must have gone to African workers.
Thus, the big question is not the numbers of Chinese 
expat labour in SSA but whether there is substantial job 
creation for African workers and whether the rates of 
workforce localization (i.e. proportion of employment 
given to African workers as opposed to expat labour) 
are low or high. There are already a number of large 
studies and plenty of specific case studies suggesting 
that levels of workforce localization (as proportions of 
African workers in Chinese firms in Africa) are higher 
than usually assumed, and have been increasing 
across several countries in the past 10-15 years 
(Shen 2013; Sautman and Yan 2015, McKinsey, 2017; 
Jenkins, 2019). The most recent and comprehensive 
source of evidence on workforce localization is the 
survey of over 1,000 Chinese firms in eight countries 
conducted by McKinsey (2017). This report shows how 
these firms largely rely on local labour (i.e. African 
workers), despite some significant variation by project 
and sector. The average rate of localization is 89%. 
The sector of operations matters and localization 
rates are higher in some sectors than in other. In the 
manufacturing sector, for instance, the proportion of 
local workers is about 95% (McKinsey, 2017: 41). This 
is consistent with another large-scale compilation of 
more than 400 cases of firms and projects from several 
hundred interviews and thousands of documents 
(Sautman and Yan, 2015), which concludes that the 
average localization rate in Africa is 85%, with most 
firms clustered within the 80–95% band. About two-
thirds of these cases and studies had localization 
rates exceeding 80%. Comparisons between firms of 
different (foreign) nationality are rare, but in one such 
study Rounds and Huang (2017) provide evidence of 
roughly similar rates of localization between Chinese 
and American firms in Kenya (78 and 82% respectively) 
even though these firms are not in the same sectors. 
There is still a lack of studies comparing the proportion 
of expatriate labour in non-Chinese firms (which we 
call ‘other foreign’ in this report) and Chinese firms 
in Africa. We present our own comparative empirical 
evidence on this question in Section 6.
Besides higher than expected localization rates, the 
above-cited surveys and compilations of case studies 
and localization data also show high levels of variation 
across African countries. National contexts matter 
and a generalised singular narrative about Chinese 
2 See also some examples of such reports in Brautigam’s excellent critical blog http://www.chinaafricarealstory.com/2012/01/africas-
new-au-building-how-many.html 
3 The origin of this bizarre claim can be traced back to a New York Times column in 1991 https://www.nytimes.com/1991/05/11/
opinion/l-china-has-used-prison-labor-in-africa-540291.html . See also Brautigam’s blog on the matter http://www.chinaafricarealstory.
com/2010/08/is-china-sending-prisoners-to-work.html
4  https://www.reporting-focac.com/5-china-africa-myths.html
5 All these calculations are based on analysis of data provided by SAIS-CARI at http://www.sais-cari.org/data-chinese-workers-in-africa
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firms in  Africa and their workforce localization fails 
to provide an accurate picture. Certain countries 
like Angola, Algeria or Equatorial Guinea receive 
more Chinese labour in absolute and relative terms 
compared to other countries where the presence 
of Chinese expat labour is much more limited. This 
has also implications for the scale of contribution 
of Chinese firms to job creation. In Ethiopia, where 
localization rates appear to be much higher, Cheru 
and Oqubay (2019) show that Chinese FDI created 
many more thousands of manufacturing jobs (nearly 
40,000 between 2000 and 2016) than other foreign 
companies. Sinkala and Zhou (2014) report similar 
trends in Chinese FDI in mining and construction in 
Zambia. While Chinese firms have created a large 
number of jobs in Africa they do use some Chinese 
labour for strategically critical positions. Especially in 
the early period of expansion of construction projects 
and FDI, Chinese firms find it advantageous to use 
Chinese workers for management, engineering, and 
skilled positions. Chinese workers were more familiar 
with “companies’ organization and process”, could 
install new equipment imported from China more 
quickly, and help make sure the first projects, which 
often had political significance, were completed in 
very short timeframes, especially when compared 
to competitors (Tang, 2016: 110). However, such 
hiring practices can change over the course of just a 
few years. In one study on Chinese SOEs in Ghana, 
Kernen and Lam (2014: 1053) conclude that Chinese 
SOEs have significantly increased the proportion 
of Ghanaian workers they employ and that ‘the 
localization experience is similar to those of Western 
companies in Africa where complete workforce 
localization takes a long time to achieve’. 
What factors underpin this variation in rates of 
localization and job creation for African workers in 
Chinese firms? The first, and probably most significant 
factor, are differences in the requirements set out by 
host country governments on which positions can 
be filled by foreign workers and the concomitant 
enforcement of such work visa regulations (Sautman 
and Yan, 2015). Some countries (e.g. Ethiopia) have 
strict visa policies and only selected categories of 
foreign workers are allowed to obtain work visas. The 
enforcement of these regulations may also be stricter. 
The high localization rates we observe in Ethiopia 
suggest this is an important policy tool that can 
determine the rate of localization by imposition.
Second, some countries are more severely affected 
by shortages of suitable local workers for technically 
demanding construction projects, or have a limited 
pool of suitable workers when competition for labour 
becomes tighter due to, for example, rapid expansion 
in infrastructure projects. For example, countries like 
Angola or Equatorial Guinea are more affected by skill 
shortages in the labour market than countries with 
better education and training systems such as South 
Africa, Ghana, or Kenya. In a country like Angola 
Chinese firms may thus find it harder to compete with 
much more established Western or local companies 
for scarce skilled or semi-skilled labour. 
Third, ownership type, i.e. whether a company is 
private or state-owned, seems to have mixed effects. 
Our own analysis of several cases of construction 
projects suggests that state-owned enterprises tend 
to employ relatively more local workers, partly due 
to their greater degree of compliance with legal 
requirements when these are set by host countries, 
and partly because of the costs of hiring Chinese 
labour in SOEs. However, the aforementioned 
McKinsey report (2017) finds the opposite for their 
sample of firms across different sectors, where 
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private firms tend to rely more on local labour 
(92%) than SOEs (81%). This difference is driven by 
the sector of operation, as private firms are more 
likely to be engaged in manufacturing and services, 
where localization rates are higher. In these sectors, 
barriers to entry for African workers are often lower 
compared to many technically complex infrastructure 
projects. Moreover, some infrastructure projects 
also suffer from the imperative of timely project 
completion, which reduces the scope for reliance 
on less experienced and therefore less well-trained 
local workers. Of course, project timelines, especially 
in infrastructure construction, are often set by local 
governments. In other words, sector matters and the 
specific technology used by a firm also shapes the 
need for expat labour in foreign firms. 
Fourth, the longer Chinese companies operate 
in a country, the more settled they are, the more 
they rely on local workers (Tang, 2016; Lam, 2014; 
Sautman and Yan, 2015; Corkin, 2012). There are 
different forces at play in this case. On the one hand, 
as Chinese firms settle in new markets and gradually 
build a core local labour force, their recruitment 
processes adapt to the new context and the skills 
developed among local workers pay off after an 
initial transitional period. On the other hand, since 
the early 2000s, the rapid growth in labour costs 
in China has meant that Chinese workers have 
become increasingly expensive and less affordable for 
companies operating overseas (Jenkins 2019). 
In short, African agency is critical in 
determining localization rates.
We see the same Chinese firms adapting and 
operating very differently in different contexts. 
In addition, Chinese firms are in Africa are highly 
heterogeneous and the varieties of Chinese capital 
display a number of different adaptation strategies. 
Overall, the evidence reviewed here unambiguously 
shows that Chinese firms have created large numbers 
of unskilled and semi-skilled jobs for African workers. 
These new jobs contribute to the gradual building 
up of an industrial labour force and therefore have 
significant implications for processes of structural 
transformation in Africa.
3.2 Working conditions 
6 An important limitation of some of these comparisons is that data on wages in most African countries are scarce and typically 
representative of the most advanced formal enterprises, i.e., excluding the informal activities where most jobs are found. Therefore a 
‘national average’ may be very high compared to the average conditions of most workers in the country.
There are still large gaps in the available evidenc 
on working conditions in Chinese companies in 
Africa. Most available empirical studies suggest that 
Chinese firms comply with national minimum wage 
legislation but in some cases offer lower wages than 
their competitors. This does not mean that wages 
are lower than national or sector averages, just 
that pay may be lower than other firms in the same 
sub-sectors. However, overall the evidence is not 
conclusive and lacks comparative quantitative rigour 
as this section shows. 
Some of the most critical reports on working 
conditions in Chinese firms in selected African 
countries lack comparators, methodological rigour 
or reliable quantitative data from workers’ surveys 
(examples are Baah and Jauch., 2009; HRW 2011; 
Shelton and Kabemba, 2012). A number of these 
reports, which suggested wages were even lower 
than minimum wages, have been questioned by other 
more in-depth studies (Lee, 2017; Yan and Sautman, 
2013). There are few studies that have attempted to 
compare wages in Chinese firms with those in other 
firms across a range of sectors. Tang (2016) provides 
various examples where reported wages were ‘low’ 
in relation to the ‘national average’ or other foreign 
firms.6 Baah and Jauch (2009) also conclude that 
Chinese firms in Angola, Ghana, Namibia, South 
Africa, and Zambia tended to pay the lowest wages 
when compared to local and other foreign firms. 
However, most case studies underpinning this widely 
cited report were essentially based on qualitative 
interviews, secondary sources and selected company-
level data from company documents, but did not 
draw on large-scale quantitative surveys of workers 
within a systematic comparative framework. Likewise, 
a much-debated HRW report on Zambian mines 
(2011) emphasized that Chinese-owned copper mines 
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offered the lowest salaries compared to other OECD-
owned mines despite paying above the national 
minimum wage, but these comparisons have been 
criticized for lack of empirical rigour (Sautman and 
Yan, 2016; Lee, 2017). Very often the small number of 
studies that offer comparative evidence on working 
conditions by firm origin are based on interviews 
with top-level managers and not on large-scale 
quantitative surveys of workers. Coniglio et al. (2015) 
have relatively more rigorous statistical methods that 
attempt to control for some firm-level attributes, like 
sector and capital and skill intensity and find that 
wages in Chinese firms are lower than both other 
foreign and domestic firms, whereas overall foreign 
TNCs tend to pay higher wages. A limitation of this 
study is that there is substantial heterogeneity, as 
all sectors are considered, and the econometric 
analysis can only control for firm-level attributes 
and not individual worker characteristics. Moreover, 
cross-country regression analyses only superficially 
account for country context, which is an important 
determinant of firm behaviour on labour issues. The 
lack of sufficient consideration of a wider range of 
confounding factors is also a limitation of many other 
studies that report on wages based on company 
management interviews only, as in the cases of 
Rounds and Zhang (2017) who mainly discuss wage 
gaps between local and expatriate workers in Kenya. 
Not all studies report lower wages in Chinese firms. 
There are also examples where wages are not as 
low as expected. A very recent survey in the Eastern 
Industrial Zone in Ethiopia suggests that average 
wages among Chinese factories in the zone are 
considered ‘low’ by workers but they are well above 
a reported national average in the formal sector 
(Fei, 2018). In a 2012 World Bank survey of firms in 
Ethiopia, median wages in Chinese firms were 60% 
higher than in domestic firms (Bashir, 2015: 8). At 
GUMCO, a Chinese ceramic manufacturer in Ghana, 
wages of Ghanaian workers (ranging between US$2.2 
and US$10 per day) were both above the national 
minimum wage of US$1.9 per day (as of 2008) and 
also above the Indian comparator plant offering 
US$1.9 per day (Akorsu and Cooke, 2011). Moreover, 
in some cases wages may be lower but this is 
compensated for by greater job stability as the study 
of mining entreprises in Zambia by Lee (2017) shows. 
Where wages are lower than comparators, there are 
different reasons, such as low initial profitability after 
important capital investments (mines in Zambia), 
tighter profit margins for small-medium firms subject 
to fierce global competition, or reliance on more 
labour-intensive methods (Tang, 2016). By contrast, 
other firms opt to pay wage premia and out-compete 
other players in the sector to attract higher-quality 
workers, as observed in some companies in Ethiopia’s 
industrial zones. The relative strength of labour 
institutions, especially unions, also contributes to 
wage equalization among foreign firms in the same 
sectors, as in South Africa (Huang and Ren, 2013).
Going beyond wages, there is some evidence of 
difficult working conditions in terms of long working 
hours, lack of written contracts, casualization, 
resistance to unionization, and more frequent 
breaches of labour regulations in Chinese firms 
compared to other foreign companies (McKinsey, 
2017; Rounds and Huang, 2017; Lee 2017; Jenkins, 
2019). At first glance, labour conflicts seem more 
frequent in Chinese-owned firms, but this may 
reflect the greater attention these firms have received 
compared to companies of other nationalities and 
especially domestic ones, as well as a reliance on 
a limited number of cases like the mining sector in 
Zambia (Rounds and Huang, 2017; Sautman and 
Yan, 2016). More conflictual relations have also 
been blamed on a perceived resistance by Chinese 
employers to the presence of unions and generally 
on communication barriers (Sautman and Yan, 
2016; Tang, 2016; Brooks, 2010). In Zambia, such 
tensions arose as workers previously used to Zambian 
state textile companies confronted stricter labour 
regimes and casualization brought by new Chinese 
owners, giving rise to frequent disputes and strikes, 
which eventually led to the closure of the factory 
(Brooks, 2010). Evidence on management-employee 
communication is patchy and few studies report on 
instances of abuse or communication clashes (HRW, 
2011; Shelton and Kabemba, 2012) but Tang and Eom 
(2019) offer arguments to account for such instances 
beyond culturalist explanations. Based on a study 
of 87 Chinese manufacturing firms across Ethiopia, 
Ghana, Tanzania and Nigeria, from 2012 to 2014, 
Tang and Eom (2019) conclude that these workplace 
tensions, sometimes reflected in reports of abuse, 
are the manifestation of the arrival of a new work 
ethic of industrial capitalism based on rigid clock 
time, in contexts where different work ethics prevail, 
something that is well known from the histories of 
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industrial capitalist development in other contexts 
(Oya, 2019). Language barriers may of course 
exacerbate such tensions (Tang, 2016; Fei, 2018). Thus 
a ‘culturalist explanation of Chinese and African work 
ethics is ahistorical’ and fails to appreciate the extent 
to which such tense encounters evolve over time as 
African workers interact with the expectations of time 
management, discipline and lifestyles expected in a 
rigid industrial capitalist environment (Tang and Eom, 
2019: 16). 
Various studies have shown that Chinese private firms 
may start operations with relatively unfavourable 
non-wage conditions but can adapt over time to 
meet demands from organized workers or from the 
host states (Lee, 2017; Tang, 2016). It is also worth 
noting that there are different kinds of non-wage 
benefits that are offered and much depends on the 
level of formalisation of labour relations, so some 
studies may focus on fringe benefits associated with 
formal contracts (such as paid sick leave, holidays, 
social security payments) whereas in other cases 
the main non-wage benefits are limited to provision 
of accommodation, transport and food, which may 
nonetheless be highly valuable to workers. Indeed, 
there seems to be a tendency among Chinese 
employers to offer accommodation and meals as way 
of facilitating labour control and retention of migrant 
workers, following a practice that is also common in 
some labour regimes in China (Lutje et al, 2013). In 
any case, studies that report on these issues in African 
contexts are not sufficiently systematic and tend to 
selectively report on some aspects and not on other 
possible benefits. Moreover, the lack of comparative 
evidence on management-worker interactions drives 
attention towards the nationality of managers and 
workers away from the role played by industrial 
capitalist work logics and sector specificities. 
Context also matters in terms of the prevailing policy 
and labour market environment that foreign investors 
find in different parts of Africa. Therefore, some of the 
findings on working conditions should also be put in 
perspective and understood within the wider context 
of labour market deregulation and privatization 
following structural adjustment reforms since the 
1980s (Fraser and Larmer, 2010). All African countries, 
after decades of structural adjustment and waves 
of liberalization and privatization, have experienced 
a systematic weakening of labour institutions and 
mass informalization and casualization of labour, 
particularly notable in urban labour markets (Lee, 
2017; Brooks, 2010; Meagher, 2016; Roubaud and 
Torelli, 2013). The majority of Chinese firms entered 
African markets at the peak of neoliberal hegemony 
on the continent. Conditions found in Zambian 
mines, for example, are more strongly linked to the 
crisis and reforms in the sector in the 1990s than to 
the nationality of foreign firms (Lee, 2017). Similarly, 
working conditions found in emerging industrial  
parks in Africa, especially in globally integrated 
production networks, may be driven by the cost 
pressures and tight margins intrinsic to such 
networks, especially in light manufacturing, which 
 are facilitated by contexts of weakened labour 
institutions (Anner, 2015; Gereffi, 2018).
On balance, the available literature suggests working 
conditions may be worse in Chinese firms when 
compared to other companies, whether in relation to 
wages or non-wage working conditions, but there is 
also evidence pointing to higher or similar wages in 
Chinese companies in some contexts.
The main problem with the available 
evidence is that there is lack of 
systematic and rigorous comparisons, 
and few studies attempt to control for 
factors other than the origin of the firm. 
As suggested in our analytical framework, various 
contextual factors, at national, sector, firm and worker 
level, are likely to account for some of the observed 
differences, but there are no available studies that 
attempt to control for a wide range of factors across 
these different levels of analysis for Chinese firms 
in African contexts. In particular, there is lack of 
sector-level evidence for like-with-like comparisons. 
In consequence, some of the published evidence is 
misleading and there is a dearth of research trying to 
explain the main causes of observed differences in 
working conditions.
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3.3 Skill development 
7 Apart from the training efforts of individual companies, the Chinese government contributes to education and training in Africa through 
scholarships, professional courses, infrastructure investments, and various other forms of partnership projects (Bashir, 2015). It is however 
beyond the scope of this report to discuss the impact of these programmes.
Sometimes low wages in early processes of 
industrialization are ‘compensated’ for by the prospect 
of acquiring new skills and more stable jobs (Fei, 
2018). Hence skill development is seen as one of the 
potential contributions from new Chinese and other 
foreign investors, especially in manufacturing. While 
construction projects provide mostly short-term 
transferable capabilities, especially for low-skilled 
workers, factories have the advantage of contributing 
to long-term capability development. However, 
there are some claims that Chinese firms make a 
very limited contribution to skill development (Baah 
and Jauch, 2009). More recent survey work suggests 
that training is provided but training provision does 
not live up to the expectations of workers, although 
those working for globally integrated firms receive 
substantial and comparatively frequent training. The 
literature almost unanimously confirms that, contrary 
to popular belief, Chinese firms do engage in labour 
training (e.g., Bashir, 2015; Shen, 2015; Corkin, 2012; 
Tang, 2016; Lampert and Mohan, 2014; Rounds and 
Huang, 2017; Fei, 2018; Lam, 2014; Kerner and Lam, 
2014). According to McKinsey (2017), nearly two-thirds 
of over 1,000 surveyed Chinese firms in Africa train 
local employees (43% in the form of apprenticeships), 
while in construction and manufacturing, where skills 
are particularly important for African workers, 73% 
of firms offer training or apprenticeships. Fei (2018) 
reports that many Ethiopian workers were attracted 
by the opportunity and experience offered by 
Chinese high-tech companies, so skill development 
was more important than wages for their decision 
to join these firms.
Variation among Chinese firms is important and useful 
policy lessons can be extracted from these differences. 
First, some sectors tend to be more skill-intensive 
and firms in those industries necessarily engage in 
more training, whereas basic assembly jobs in light 
manufacturing produce a more limited range of skill 
transfer (Chen et al., 2016). Second, larger and more 
globally integrated firms have fairly sophisticated 
training systems, including combinations of local 
training centres, periods of intensive learning and 
skill development in China (especially for managers, 
skilled personnel, and semi-skilled workers), 
and continuous on-the-job training with career 
development programmes (Tang, 2016; Sun, 2017).7 
Third, modalities of training vary a lot, with foreign 
transnational corporations (TNCs) more likely to use 
formalised mechanisms, and domestic firms and 
some Chinese companies relying more on on-the-
job training and more informalised and sometimes 
‘militaristic’ modalities to improve both technical and 
‘soft skills’ (Tang and Eom, 2019; Coniglio et al., 2015; 
Bashir, 2015). However, the literature shows that both 
formal and informal training mechanisms contribute 
to skill upgrading. Fourth, building local skills and 
capabilities is also a way of meeting expectations from 
host states, which are important for the accumulation 
logic of many Chinese SOEs (Lee, 2017). Fifth, in some 
countries the state (through investment agencies and 
labour institutions) and lead firms in global production 
networks (GPNs) exert pressure on suppliers to boost 
skill formation in host countries and thereby contribute 
to the gradual development of skill development 
‘systems’ associated with priority sectors. Sixth, 
contribution to skill development is strengthened 
as firms increase workforce localization rates and 
are compelled to invest in training local workers to 
maintain their competitive position (Kerner and Lam, 
2014; Tang 2016).
One important reason why firms feel compelled 
to train their new workers is dissatisfaction with 
existing technical and vocational education and 
training (TVET) systems in host countries, which 
makes managers prefer to “hire someone off the 
street who’s a blank slate” and directly invest in the 
most relevant skills for the company (McKinsey, 2017: 
40). The fact that existing TVET programmes fail to 
deliver for the aspirations of accelerated industrial 
development in countries like Ethiopia is an important 
wake-up call to rethink training systems and their 
connections with industrial investors. In fact, this 
strategy of skill building from scratch is common to 
many other foreign investors, especially in export-
oriented factories. Indeed, job experience is the most 
effective form of training in the long-term process of 
industrial development (Amsden, 2001). Gerschenkron 
(1962) recognized long ago that the availability of 
cheap labour in late industrialising countries was no 
guarantee of rapid industrialization, because in most 
agrarian-based economies the kind of labour force that 
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suits the demands of industrial factory work (in terms 
of time management, discipline, effort, reliability, etc.) 
is actually scarce (see also Oya, 2019). Thus, besides 
the existence or not of formal training programmes, 
these experiences suggest that hundreds of thousands 
of African workers who are often migrants finding 
entry-level non-agricultural jobs, are learning the 
basic skills of the occupations that are likely to grow 
in the next decades, thereby making a contribution to 
the prospects of further structural transformation.
Therefore, any analysis of working conditions must achieve at least two goals:
a. Consider a wide range of factors that may affect variation in working conditions, including macro 
context, sector-level features, firm attributes and individual worker characteristics.
b. Try to explain reasons behind observed differences, whether these relate to the origin of the firm, sector 
or different labour market segments.
Based on this review of the literature the next section presents the main features of our research design, which 
endeavours to tackle the three main problems identified above. 
3.4 Summary 
This section has taken stock of the available evidence on labour outcomes in Chinese enterprises in Africa. 
The literature on labour issues and outcomes within the broad ‘China in Africa’ field is still in its early days. 
The first main conclusion of this review is that much more empirically grounded analysis is needed. Many 
of the debates and claims that have dominated the headlines in the intersection of media representation 
and some academic research lack solid empirical foundations. While an emerging body of ethnographic 
and qualitative research has helped debunk some myths (Lee, 2017; Tang, 2016), there is still a lack of 
rigorous quantitative evidence. 
There are three main issues with the existing literature, despite notable exceptions:
1. Many claims are made without an adequate comparative framework. Comparisons are either lacking 
or unbalanced, given the heterogeneity of firms and contexts. An important problem with the 
way labour issues (and many other aspects) in the ‘China in Africa’ field have been analyzed is the 
‘methodological nationalism’ which assumes intrinsic characteristics that apply to all Chinese actors in 
Africa. Rigorous comparative evidence is needed to overcome biases and empirically test the notion of 
Chinese ‘exceptionalism’, which has already been questioned in the labour studies literature elsewhere 
(Chan, 2015).
2. Much of the available evidence emerges from (a) qualitative research; (b) small-sample surveys with 
no comparators; (c) firm management-level interviews where outcome measures are based on 
interviews with managers and not workers. To our knowledge there is no large-scale comparative 
quantitative survey of working conditions from the perspective of labour, i.e. workers’ surveys rather 
than self-reported data from company management, looking at conditions in both Chinese and 
non-Chinese companies. 
3. The literature review also shows striking variations of findings for the three core questions on 
workforce localization, working conditions and skill development. This heterogeneity gives credence  
to the value of a multi-layered framework of labour regime configurations, incorporating national 
political economic dynamics, sector-level issues and micro-level workplace encounters, where the 
origin of an enterprise is one of multiple factors that affect employment outcomes. 
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4 How did we approach the 
questions? Research design 
In light of the main research questions, the analytical 
framework, and the findings from the desk review, 
we adopted a research design based on a sequential 
mixed methods approach that was operationalised 
through a carefully designed comparative framework. 
As argued in the introduction and in Section 3, 
one of the problems with the existing literature on 
labour issues in Chinese firms is the lack of adequate 
comparators and contextual evidence.
With this in mind, and considering the different levels of analysis of our analytical 
framework, our research design was organised around a 2-by-2-by-3-by-2 
comparative framework: 
• two countries (Ethiopia and Angola); 
• two sectors (manufacturing and construction) and specific sub-sectors within each of these; 
• three origins (national/domestic, Chinese and other foreign); 
• whenever possible, two varieties of Chinese capital were considered (private and state-owned), 
with distributions relevant to each sub-sector. Chinese state-owned enterprises are mainly found in 
infrastructure construction and private firms mostly in manufacturing.
The choice of only two countries and two relevant sectors was obviously also determined by the 
budgetary limits of the project.
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In order to reduce excessive variation in outcomes 
and explanatory variables, the surveys focused 
on the type of workers that represent the vast 
majority of jobs created in the target sectors, 
especially by foreign companies. According 
to evidence collected through interviews with 
managers and HR departments in selected 
companies in target sectors, most jobs created 
for national workers in Ethiopia and Angola are in 
the low-skilled or semi-skilled categories. Many 
semi-skilled workers have been upgraded from 
low-skilled status through on-the-job training 
and direct work experience. Typically, eight out 
ten jobs created by firms in these sectors are 
within these target skill categories. We therefore 
sampled only low-skilled and semi-skilled 
workers. The identification of low- and semi-
skilled categories was based on a combination 
of two criteria, namely (a) specific job title and 
tasks as specified/reported by worker, and (b) 
qualifications in terms of education level and total 
number of schooling years. These classifications 
were also cross-checked against broad salary 
scales for consistency purposes. This approach 
was more precise and less crude than other 
attempts at classifying workers by skill groups 
as in Teal (2016: 9), who defines ‘unskilled’ as ‘ 
those with no education or incomplete primary’, 
‘low skill’ as ‘those with primary complete and 
secondary incomplete’ and ‘medium skill’ as those 
with secondary complete or tertiary incomplete’. 
As data presented in section 7 will show, most of 
our workers could be classified across these three 
schooling categories but their skill-group location 
was primarily determined by the nature of the job 
they performed as there were cases of workers in 
low-skilled occupations (factory line production 
workers) who had higher education completed.
To be able to depict how the labour force 
dynamics result from interactions across the three 
dimensions identified in the analytical framework, 
i.e. the country, the sector and the firm, we 
collected an integrated mixture of quantitative 
and qualitative primary data. We used four main 
data collection tools: structured quantitative 
interviews with workers, a structured quantitative 
firm questionnaire, semi-structured qualitative 
interviews with key informants, including policy 
makers, company managers and trade unionists, 






























Table 1 - Comparative framework
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4.1 Sampling process and outcomes
We sampled firms in the relevant target sectors and then representative samples of low- and semi-skilled 
workers within each firm. All of the workers we sampled were nationals of Angola or Ethiopia. While 
selection within each firm was randomised, the sampling of firms was purposive. Firm selection followed 
analytical and empirical criteria, starting from the rationale for target sub-sectors:
✔ Sectors where job creation for low- and semi-skilled workers had been very significant in the 
previous decade. 
✔ Sectors where there was a large enough pool of comparable firms of the categories needed for this 
research: Chinese, domestic and other foreign. 
✔ Sectors where more low-skilled or semi-skilled labour can be hired, i.e. where barriers to entry are 
lower, in order to capture some new labour market entrants in such sectors.
In Ethiopia these criteria led us to select three sub-sectors: textiles and garments as well as leather 
products for manufacturing, and road building in the construction sector, the latter linked to the scaling up 
of state investment in infrastructure. In Angola, the selected sectors were the building materials sector for 
manufacturing, and road and hydroelectric dam building in the construction sector.
Once specific sub-sectors were selected, we conducted extensive scoping research to gather the 
necessary information for company selection. Our sample of companies was chosen according to the 
following criteria in this order of importance:
✔ Firms had to be important generators of employment, i.e. the largest and more significant job creators 
within each subsector, according to official data and interviews with sector experts and company 
managers.
✔ We included firms that were considered as among the most important in each sector (based on 
interviews in the scoping phase) and were active at the time of the survey. This was an important 
constraint for the road construction sector, where activity and employment depend on active projects. 
Additionally, for logistical reasons we prioritised construction projects that were not in the most 
remote areas of each country.
✔ We included both large and medium firms, but not small-scale firms, using the scale standards within 
each sector.
✔ We ensured that we selected at least some examples of enterprises that were known for best practice 
in labour standards, so that the sample had a ‘top benchmark’ against which other firms could be 
compared, instead of a sector ‘average’ for which there was no secondary information.
The final sample included all of the most analytically 
important firms across the three subsectors, 
according to these criteria. We compared the 
leading Chinese firms with the leading other foreign 
and domestic firms in same sectors, and not to 
the ‘average’. An ‘average’ sample would have 
necessitated more complete sample frames and 
would have unnecessarily added heterogeneity to 
comparisons, by including firms of very different sizes 
and capacities.
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Table 2 - Ethiopian sample
Sector Chinese Other foreign Ethiopian Total
Manufacturing 167 197 170 303
Construction 124 59 120 534
Total 291 256 290 837
One aim of the project was to try to obtain 
representative samples within each company or site. 
In the manufacturing sector the sample was restricted 
only to workers directly involved in production, so as 
to exclude cleaners, security guards and other ancillary 
staff, as well as clerical and administrative workers. 
This meant following a number of basic principles for 
selection protocol: 
1. First, there should be a large enough absolute sample 
size for each site/firm: it was decided that sample 
sizes within each firm/site would range between 
20-30 depending on the relative size of total 
employment in the firm/site. Larger samples sizes 
within same firm/site would not add much statistical 
precision and would add to costs unnecessarily. 
Moreover, the aim was to cover a reasonable number 
of firms/sites, as variation was expected to happen 
more between than within them. 
2. Second, we aimed to work with precise and 
unbiased sampling frames (i.e. lists of workers) as 
far as possible. In order to construct suitable local 
sampling frames, field supervisors were trained in 
and employed a variety of procedures, including 
making on-site lists of workers in sections of the 
factory or site, working with employee lists provided 
by the company which were then independently 
checked for completeness by field supervisors, or 
using systematic random sampling, which obviated 
the need for precise sampling frames.
3. Third, independent of how sampling frames 
were constructed, interviewed respondents were 
randomly selected by field supervisors, who used 
laptops or tablets to generate random numbers for 
each of the two relevant worker strata, low-skilled 
and semi-skilled.
Generally sampling protocols were strictly 
followed in Ethiopia, so samples are comparable 
according to expectations. In Angola, teams 
encountered some challenges in a number 
of Angolan and other foreign firms (i.e. non-
Chinese firms), where field teams had to stratify 
and randomly select workers from relatively 
restricted sample frames that may not have 
included temporary workers or recent hires, 
and represent mainly a core labour force. In the 
construction sector, a crisis in Angola affected 
some firms more than others. As a result of a 
national fiscal squeeze during the time of the 
survey, project execution was hampered and 
several Angolan and other foreign firms were 
operating below capacity, with mostly their 
core permanent employees, whereas most 
Chinese firms in the sample were operating at 
higher intensity and initiating projects financed 
by the new China Credit Line approved in 2015. 
Therefore, their workforces were more mixed 
and included temporary project workers and 
new hires in greater proportions than other 
comparable firms in the same sector. This sample 
bias is therefore acknowledged as a limitation 
but was unavoidable given the circumstances 
of Angola at the time of the survey, especially 
for the infrastructure construction sector. This 
experience also shows the methodological 
challenges in trying to achieve fully comparable 
samples in research on these sectors, especially 
given the impact of volatile business cycles. In 
any case, since the potential bias was captured, 
we use this information to conduct a more 
precise statistical analysis and qualify some of the 
findings for Angola in Section 8. 
Source: IDCEA survey, 2017
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Table 3 - Angolian sample
Sector Chinese Other foreign Angolian Total
Manufacturing 144 85 68 297
Construction 167 120 98 385
Total 311 205 166 682
Source: IDCEA survey, 2017
The total size of samples for both countries was 
large enough for an adequate representation of 
low-skilled and semi-skilled workers in the target 
sectors, given total employment levels and the 
number of leading firms active at the time of surveys. 
The balance between sectors was also designed 
to capture the relatively greater significance of 
manufacturing in Ethiopia and infrastructure 
construction in Angola for research questions 
on employment outcomes in Chinese and other 
firms in these two countries. The manufacturing 
sector in Ethiopia has created many more 
jobs than factories in Angola, whereas the 
infrastructure construction boom and associated 
jobs have been relatively more significant in 
Angola (see Tables 2 and 3).
4.2 Firm characteristics
Firms were purposively selected because of the 
significance of the target sectors for Angola’s and 
Ethiopia’s economic development and because they 
were leading players in these sectors. All the firms 
included in the sample are therefore important  
within the public works and industrial landscapes of 
both countries.
Given the different economic and social contexts of 
Angola and Ethiopia, the characteristics of these firms 
vary substantially. In Angola, we find relatively large 
infrastructure construction companies with access to 
good technology and high quality machinery, capable 
of the most demanding infrastructure projects, both 
in road building and dam construction. The firms in 
the Angolan sample included several well-known 
transnational contractors from Europe and Latin 
America with vast overseas markets. The Chinese 
sample also included some of the top Chinese 
overseas state-owned contractors with significant 
presence in Africa. For these companies African 
markets are critical to their overseas expansion. Like 
in Angola, firms selected for this study in Ethiopia 
included only top-grade contractors. In Ethiopia all 
road construction firms are graded by the Ethiopian 
Roads Authority (ERA) and the grade a company 
receives is supposed to reflect its capabilities in terms 
of equipment, staffing, finance, and experience. 
The types of road projects we looked at, asphalt 
and gravel roads, are always awarded to grade 
one contractors. Hence firms in the Ethiopian 
construction sample also included some important 
Chinese contractors with operations in several African 
countries, as well as other transnational contractors 
from the Middle East and Europe.
The manufacturing sectors in Ethiopia and Angola are 
very different and the firms sampled therefore differ 
significantly. In Angola, the limited industrial growth 
the country has experienced has been concentrated 
in the beverage industry (which we did not cover 
because few Chinese firms are active in the sector) 
and in the manufacture of building materials, which 
grew rapidly on the back of increasing demand 
for construction materials spurred by the rapid 
reconstruction effort in the period 2002-15 (Wolf 
and Cheng, 2018). Employment in manufacturing did 
not grow as fast in Angola as in Ethiopia, where the 
government’s industrialization drive and the arrival of 
dozens of foreign investors to its light manufacturing 
sector acted as important catalysts. In Angola, 
the persistent dependence on imports of building 
materials hampered more rapid growth in domestic 
industries. Moreover, according to most interviews 
with managers, factories in Angola also suffered from 
significant supply constraints that drove costs up, 
namely unreliable and expensive electricity, foreign 
exchange constraints, weak transport infrastructure 
and difficulties in servicing industrial machinery. Some 
of the factories we sampled were on the, arguably 
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ill-defined, frontier between the informal and formal 
sectors. Although they were all registered in existing 
industrial censuses, their operations were not always 
characterized by formal arrangements in terms of 
contracts and licences, especially in the case of some 
‘translocal’ Chinese firms.8 By contrast, all domestic 
Angolan and other, non-Chinese, foreign industrial 
firms sampled in Angola were essentially formalised 
at all levels. Although they were large in relation 
to their own sub-sectors, the average number of 
permanent workers in these firms does not exceed 
400 (see Table 4). The outliers in terms of size are 
cement factories, the biggest of which were all 
included in the study. At the time of the survey many 
of these firms had laid off workers as a result of the 
crisis in the sector.
8 Rounds and Zhang (2017: 6) drawing on Sautman and Yan (2016) define ‘translocal firms’ as ‘firms that are started, owned and/or run by 
foreign nationals, and may have a board of advisors in a foreign country, but are exclusively registered locally’. 
Table 4 - Main characteristics of sampled firms in Angola
Construction of infrastructure
  Angolan Other foreign Chinese
% private 100 100 10
Number of permanent 
workers (average) 
1162 1820 1055










Brazil and Angola Portugal China
Main markets Angola Europa and Africa China and Africa




  Angolan Other foreign Chinese
% private 100 100 100
Number of permanent 
workers (average) 
336 248 373
Dominant type of firm
Mixed: large 
privatized SOEs and 
medium-size firms
Medium-size FDI




Angola and Portugal Portugal China
Main markets Angola Angola Angola
Experience / time in Angolan market 
(average years)
22 12 10
Source: IDCEA firm-level survey, 2018
Comparatively, the Ethiopian manufacturing sector 
is much better developed. While Ethiopia is still a 
heavily agrarian economy, the country embarked on 
an ambitious industrialisation drive, backed by state 
investment and, more recently, overseas loans, in the 
early 2000s. Our sample included the leading firms in 
the textile & garment and leather product sectors (e.g. 
shoes) for the three ownership categories. The sample 
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is a mix of enterprises in terms of market orientation, 
but, unlike Angola, an important part of the sample 
included companies that are integrated into global 
production networks. These are all foreign firms 
that recently established themselves in the country, 
most after 2010. As shown in in Table 5, by 2018 both 
Chinese and other foreign manufacturing companies 
had only been in active in Ethiopia for an average of 
four and five years, respectively, though some of the 
companies only arrived in 2016. By contrast most of 
the sampled Ethiopian manufacturing firms have a 
long history in the country, some having been former 
SOEs. The average age of Ethiopian manufacturing 
companies in 2018 was 43 years. Both Chinese and 
other foreign manufacturing companies are also 
notably larger than Ethiopian firms. This discrepancy 
is likely to grow wider as the more recently arrived 
foreign firms are still in the process of expanding  
their operations.
All road contractors in Ethiopia were the top 
infrastructure builders in terms of technical 
capabilities and experience, and all are relatively 
large in terms of the number of employees. Chinese 
companies have been active in Ethiopia for around 15 
years on average (see Table 5). Chinese contractors 
tend to dominate the market, so there was a limited 
pool of other foreign companies available to sample 
at the time of surveys. Ethiopian contractors are 
well established, with an average company age of 
26 years, and have substantially upgraded in the 
past 15 years on the back of numerous public work 
contracts. Both Ethiopian and Chinese contractors are 
on average very large, though the distribution in both 
cases is skewed somewhat by very large SOEs, while 
other foreign firms are much smaller on average and 
operate on a smaller number of projects.
Table 5 - Main characteristic of sampled firms in Ethiopia
Road construction
  Ethiopian Other foreign Chinese
% private 83 66 0
Number of workers (average) 4,020 370 3,970






of management Ethiopian Middle East, India China
Main markets Ethiopia Middle East, India China, Asia and Africa
Experience / time in Ethiopian 
market (average years) 26 5 15
Textile & garment, leather products manufacturing
  Ethiopian Other foreign Chinese
% private 87.5 100 100
Number of workers (average) 815 2,545 1,845
Dominant type of firm Large private firms, one SOE TNCs TNCs
Prevailing nationality 
of management Ethiopia Mixed China
Main markets Ethiopia, Turkey, EU US, India and EU US and EU
Experience / time in Ethiopian 
market (average years) 43 5 4
Source: IDCEA firm-level survey, 2018
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5 Angola and Ethiopia: 
different patterns of growth 
The first layer of our multi-scalar labour regime 
configuration framework requires analysis of the 
macro-dynamics concerning the national and 
regional-level contexts in which employment takes 
place. This section provides an overview of the 
macro-economic and social contexts of Angola 
and Ethiopia, with particular focus on their different 
growth patterns, investment dynamics, sector trends 
and labour market structures. Later on, Section 7 
will further flesh out some of the national contextual 
factors most directly relevant to the discussion of 
labour outcomes.
Angola and Ethiopia have been two of the fastest 
growing African countries in the post-2000 period. 
Angola’s economy grew at an annual rate of 6.4% 
between 2000 and 2017, and at over 8% if we 
consider the boom period from 2002 to 2014, before 
the oil price crisis hit the economy. Ethiopia has 
maintained high growth rates for over a decade, 
and grew at 9.2% in 2017. In both countries growth 
has been partly driven by high investment rates, 
especially so in Ethiopia which increased its gross 
capital formation as a percentage of GDP from 20% 
in 2000 to around 40% in the years 2015-17. Yet, 
growth patterns and structural economic conditions 
in Ethiopia and Angola differ substantially. Angola 
is an oil exporter and much of its GDP growth is 
determined by trends in oil prices and the impact 
these have on linkages between the size of oil 
rents and other economic activities (Wanda, 2016). 
Structural change in Angola has been driven by the 
vagaries of the oil sector in terms of shares of GDP, 
but manufacturing and especially the construction 
sector experienced high growth rates in absolute 
terms during the postwar national reconstruction 
phase. Ethiopia is not rich in natural resources but has 
a large agricultural sector that still influences growth 
variation. However, in the past two decades growth in 
other sectors and structural change have gained pace 
(Martins 2017). Both manufacturing and services have 
expanded particularly rapidly in the recent period of 
high economic growth.
Angola came out of a protracted civil war in 2002 
with the military victory of the ruling party MPLA 
over UNITA. The legacies of decades of destructive 
civil war included large numbers of internally 
displaced people, dilapidated infrastructure, and a 
severe dependence on the oil sector. Poverty was 
widespread, especially in rural areas and large urban 
slums that hosted thousands of internal refugees, 
and levels of inequality were very high. The post-
conflict political settlement reflected the reinforced 
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power of the MPLA regime at a time where the 
imperative to ‘deliver’ on economic development 
became increasingly urgent. The early phase of 
the national reconstruction efforts coincided with 
a global commodity price boom, which resulted in 
very high oil prices and allowed the Angolan state to 
increase public investment in economic and social 
infrastructure. A construction boom ensued with 
important implications for employment dynamics. 
This was reflected in the expansion of public sector 
employment by nearly 18,000 additional jobs per 
annum in the 2002-12 period (Instituto Nacional de 
Estatística, 2013), and the ambitious reconstruction 
programme which created more than 250,000 direct 
jobs in the construction sector via public works, 
along with indirect and induced employment (Figure 
2). Construction was, until 2015, the most dynamic 
non-agricultural sector in terms of the speed of 
direct employment creation. Arguably, despite the 
absence of official estimates, indirect and induced 
employment creation associated with the expansion 
of construction and public works is likely to also have 
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Figure 2 - The growth of employment in construction in Angola
Source: Author elaboration based on data from INE (2013)
Like Angola, Ethiopia experienced a devastating civil 
war, with ethnically-based rebel groups fighting a 
centralised military dictatorship. By the late 1980s, 
military rule and a planned economy, exacerbated 
by the ongoing conflict, had turned Ethiopia into an 
economic basket case. The end of the country’s civil 
war in 1991 brought into power a series governments 
dominated by the victorious Ethiopian People’s 
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), who 
turned towards a market economy, while maintaining 
autocratic control of the political system and mass 
media. The EPRDF sought political legitimacy through 
economic development and from the mid-2000s, 
articulated a strategy of state-led industrialisation 
(Weis, 2016). This strategy evolved over successive 
governments and today rests on two key planks: 
the use of experienced foreign firms to drive 
manufacturing development, and strategic investment 
in basic economic infrastructure financed both 
through overseas loans and Ethiopian government 
funds. Consequently, as shown in Figure 3, Ethiopia 
has seen a rapid expansion of both construction and 
manufacturing, especially in the post-2010 period. 
According to the National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE) the 
share of the construction sector in industry reached 
over 70% in 2017/18 (NBE, 2018). The growth in 
public works is reflected in the rapid expansion of the 
Ethiopian road network, which tripled in both overall 
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length and in terms of the length of asphalt roads 
between 2005 and 2018 (NBE, 2018: 19). 
There are important differences 
between the two countries in terms 
of labour market structures and 
their determinants.
The first main difference is labour force size. 
According the latest available labour force survey 
for Ethiopia, 43 million people were economically 
active in 2013, 72.7% of whom in the agricultural 
sector, 1.9% in construction, and only 4.5% in the 
manufacturing sector. According to demographic 
projections the labour force in 2017-18 exceeded 
50 million people. Despite the dominance of 
agricultural employment in official statistics, 
recorded wage employment (primarily in formal 
sector occupations) almost doubled in the period 
2007-17, while the labour force grew by 40% in 
the same period (ILO, 2018a). Unemployment and 
underemployment rates in Ethiopia have declined in 
both urban and rural areas since the 1990s (World 
Bank, 2016: 33), and labour force participation rates 
have increased, while dependency ratios declined 
(EEA, 2016). Despite accelerated urbanisation, the 
Ethiopian rural population grew by 23 million between 
2001 and 2014, of whom 13.1 million are of working 
age (EEA, 2016), hence adding to the employment 
challenge the country currently faces. There are no 
signs yet of significant labour market tightening, at 
least in the ‘formal’ sector, largely because of the 
substantial pool of new labour market entrants. 
Studies of real wages in urban Ethiopia show a 
worrying decline, with significant fluctuations as a 
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Figure 3 - Economic transformation in Ethiopia: industrial and construction growth, 1995-2017
Source: Authors’ elaboration from World Bank Development Indicators (2019)
By contrast, Angola, according to the 2014 population 
census, only had 5.5 million people in employment, 
nearly 92% of whom were evenly distributed between 
agriculture and – predominantly informal – services. 
By 2017 the size of the projected labour force was 
12 million potential workers, making it much smaller 
than Ethiopia’s. There are severe shortages of skills 
across all sectors. In the early post-conflict years the 
Angolan labour market was characterised by high 
levels of unemployment in urban areas and expanding 
informality, which reflected the need for the poorest 
segments of the Angolan population to survive by 
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any means. During the war refugees flocked to urban 
centres. This war-driven accelerated urbanization 
led to an excess supply of labour which pushed 
up levels of informality in the main urban centres. 
Angola shares with many other African countries 
a widespread dominance of informality in urban 
labour markets (Roubaud & Torelli, 2013). Moreover, 
current unemployment rates remain stubbornly high, 
compared to other African countries, at between 
25% and 30%, and nearly 50% for youth (INE, 2019). 
The expansion in jobs in construction and other 
non-agricultural activities led to some labour market 
tightening, despite the prevailing high unemployment 
rates, reflecting the segmentation of the labour 
markets. Official statistics suggest a significant increase 
in real wages between 2002-12 in the construction 
sector and public administration, a trend that was likely 
reversed by the stagnation of the 2015-17 period. The 
same sources also show wide gaps between average 
wages in construction and public administration and 
what is reported for trade, which includes the bulk of 
informal trade activities often employing large numbers 
of very poor people.
In both Angola and Ethiopia, the government’s 
growth strategy relies, in part, on Chinese funding 
and the expertise provided by Chinese companies 
and businesspeople. During the past decade, both 
countries have usually ranked among the top 5 
recipients of Chinese official finance for infrastructure, 
as markets for Chinese contractors, and as 
destinations of Chinese FDI in Africa. In particular, the 
presence of Chinese contractors, especially state-
owned enterprises, is very strong in both countries, 
compared to contractors of other origins. Ethiopia 
relies heavily on overseas contractors in building up 
basic infrastructure. Consequently, Ethiopia is an 
important recipient of Chinese contracted overseas 
projects, and, as in many parts of Africa, Chinese 
construction contractors have been very successful in 
winning contracts in Ethiopia. In 2016 alone, Chinese 
contractors reported USD 4.7 billion worth of project 
revenue in Ethiopia, equivalent to 6.7% of Ethiopian 
GDP, and 26 of the 32 international contractors 
operating in Ethiopia in 2017 were Chinese (Wolf and 
Cheng, 2018). While most Chinese manufacturing 
companies in Ethiopia are private enterprises, Chinese 
construction companies are either national or 
provincial SOEs. Chinese FDI into Ethiopia grew rapidly 
after 2008 and by 2017 annual flows had reached 
USD 181 million, while stocks stood at USD 1.75 billion. 
Chinese investors in Ethiopia have been especially 
drawn to the construction and manufacturing sectors, 
unlike in other African countries where mining and 
services attract a larger proportion of investments. 
Such investment volumes obviously generate new 
employment. According to data provided Cheru and 
Oqubay (2019), who draw on Ethiopian Investment 
Commission (EIC) data and other sources, foreign 
investors created around of 183,000 manufacturing 
jobs in the period 2000-2017, with Chinese firms 
accounting for 21% of these new jobs, as shown in 
Figure 4 below (Cheru and Oqubay, 2019). Our own 
inventory of EIC manufacturing investments between 
2010 and 2017 also confirms that Chinese firms rank 
first as source of manufacturing jobs created by FDI, 
with one third of permanent employment created 
during this period. Another study estimated the 
number of jobs created by Chinese FDI across different 
sectors at over 100,000 in the 2000s (Nicolas, 2017). 
These are significant numbers in both the Ethiopian 
and more broadly African contexts. In the period 2013-
17 many of these jobs were created in new industrial 
parks which form a key plank of Ethiopia’s industrial 
strategy. Job creation in Ethiopian industrial parks has 
been rapid and around 65,000 jobs had been created 
across all parks by 2018. 
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Figure 4 - Manufacturing employment generated (cumulative) by foreign firms in Ethiopia, 2000-2018
Source: Ethiopian Investment Commission (2018) unpublished; reproduced from Cheru and Oqubay (2019: 292) 
The picture in Angolan manufacturing is different 
both in terms of growth and in terms of sectoral 
patterns. While there are Chinese firms active in 
the Angolan manufacturing sector, these tend to 
be ‘translocal’ firms established by private Chinese 
entrepreneurs. These businesspeople are part 
of the growing Chinese diaspora in Angola. The 
biggest wave of Chinese immigration into Angola 
occurred in the early reconstruction period, 
especially in the early 2000s, when over 100,000 
Chinese migrants are estimated to have settled in 
the country. Most came to work in construction, 
but some also to establish small- and medium-
sized businesses, especially in services, and, to a 
lesser extent, also in manufacturing. None of the 
Chinese manufacturing firms in Angola are globally 
integrated suppliers and FDI to manufacturing is 
still limited, even if our interviews did suggest that 
a significant share of the limited manufacturing 
employment in Angola is in firms that are either 
foreign or ‘translocal’. 
In sum, Angola and Ethiopia face important 
employment challenges, in terms of the need for 
both substantial job creation and for accelerated 
structural change with higher productivity and higher 
wage jobs. The following sections of this report will 
shed light on (a) the extent to which Chinese and 
other firms generate employment, in particular the 
contentious issue of workforce localization rates in 
infrastructure construction and manufacturing; (b) 
the patterns of the emerging labour force in these 
sectors; and (c) the quality of these new, much 
needed, jobs.
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6 Do Chinese firms hire local workers? Myths 
and realities on workforce localization
One of the main advantages of FDI is the potential 
for rapid job creation. However, local workers 
will only be able to find jobs in FDI firms if these 
companies are willing to localise their workforces, 
that is, to employ local labour. There is a common 
perception that Chinese firms in Africa rely mostly on 
Chinese labour and only hire local labour to a limited 
extent, as discussed in Section 3.1. In this section 
we provide evidence from our own desk review of 
a wide range of published sources and surveys of 
firms and add findings from our own firm surveys in 
Angola and Ethiopia. 
As part of the desk review we collected all available 
evidence on rates of workforce localization in 
Chinese firms operating in African countries. We 
compiled nearly 60 databases, studies and cases 
across the wide spectrum of projects from very low 
to very high levels of localization covering a period 
of more than ten years, and arrived at a weighted 
average of 85% (see Appendix A for an illustrative 
selection of these sources). About two-thirds of 
these cases and studies estimated localization 
rates exceeding 80%. There are striking differences 
between countries like Angola or Equatorial Guinea, 
which received more Chinese labour in both 
absolute and relative terms, compared to other 
countries where the presence of Chinese expat labour 
is very limited. 
Even in countries where localization rates were 
relatively lower, overall local job creation was not 
meaningless. For example, one of the flagship 
projects in Angola, the development of a new 
satellite town with 20,000 apartments by CITIC 
Construction (Kilamba-Kiaxi phase I) employed 
cumulatively 36,000 Angolan workers in different 
stages over 54 months, representing just 60% of 
the total labour force in a single project (Bo 2014). 
This project applied particularly labour-intensive 
methods, which generated more jobs as a result. 
The type of construction project also matters: we 
observed in Angola that in flagship infrastructure 
projects with demanding technical standards firms 
had no option but to bring in specialized experienced 
workers in order to meet the tight time schedule 
and the quality expectations of the client (i.e. the 
Angolan authorities). In the absence of strong local 
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government requirements for workforce localization, 
companies instead operated under the pressures of 
time and technical demands. The segmentation of the 
Angolan infrastructure construction market may have 
contributed to lower localization rates among Chinese 
contractors. In several interviews it was reported that 
Chinese firms had been subject to particular stringent 
timeframes and strong pressure to complete projects, 
especially prior to elections, given the political 
expediency associated with the process of national 
reconstruction. These firms also prioritised their 
competitive advantage of faster completion even if at 
the expense of hiring and training more local workers. 
What do our own firm surveys show in terms of 
workforce localization rates in 2016-17? According 
to our firm-level surveys and qualitative interviews, 
rates of localization in Chinese firms in Ethiopia are 
very high. Even in the construction sector, where 
the presence of foreign labour is common in other 
African countries, localization rates were above 
90%. The differences with other foreign companies, 
especially in the manufacturing sector, were not 
significant. In Ethiopia, Chinese construction firms hire 
local managers for middle-management positions, 
whereas in Angola this practice was much rarer. In 
Ethiopian construction sites Chinese employees were 
found only in financial management and in some key 
technical positions requiring highly specialist skills. 
As shown in Section 5, in the manufacturing sector 
Chinese firms have been the leading contributors 
to job creation since 2000. Arguably, given the 
dominance of Chinese road contractors in the road 
building sector at the time of the survey, we can 
conclude that these firms also led the volume of job 
creation in this segment.
The picture in Ethiopia is in line with a strategy of 
minimising operating costs, as expatriate workers 
are much more expensive than Ethiopian workers in 
the same position. From our qualitative interviews 
we learnt that a common pattern for newly-arrived 
foreign investors is to bring in some expatriate staff 
in semi-skilled positions to assist with start-up and 
to help train Ethiopian workers. These expatriates 
are generally drawn down as soon as they can be 
replaced with Ethiopian workers. When firms struggle 
to fill these positions with local managers, they may 
be forced to operate below capacity given the high 
costs of bringing additional foreign staff to increase 
the number of shifts, as was reported by some 
export-oriented factories in new industrial parks. To 
an extent high localization rates in Ethiopia are due 
to the government’s firm stance in preventing the 
use of expatriate labour for positions that could be 
filled by Ethiopians. As noted above, visa restrictions 
and monitoring of labour hiring in Ethiopia are 
contributing to higher localization rates than many 
other African countries.  
In contrast to Ethiopia, Angola is considered one of 
the countries where the dependence on Chinese 
workers is greatest, partly because of the speed and 
scale of reconstruction projects, partly because of 
the binding constraints in access to workers with 
relevant experience and qualifications, most of whom 
were already employed in existing Angolan and other 
foreign firms when Chinese contractors arrived in the 
country. Data from our firm surveys and qualitative 
research suggest that localization rates are on average 
lower in Chinese firms, but the differences are not as 
large as expected, and most Chinese firms have rates 
that are higher than reported in earlier studies (Tang 
2010). The average localization rate for Chinese firms 
is 74%, whereas it is 88% for non-Chinese firms (see 
Table 6). If we only consider low-skilled and semi-
skilled workers, the proportion of Angolan workers 
in Chinese firms is around 85%, with many firms 
not employing any Chinese workers for low-skilled 
positions anymore. 
Table 6 - Workforce localization rates in Angola
Average sample localization rates (%) Not Chinese Chinese Total No. firms
Construction 86 71 79 19
Manufacturing 92 78 84 15
total 88 74 81 34
Source: IDCEA survey, 2017
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These differences are however not as large as 
expected given the tendency of Chinese firms to 
hire more Chinese workers in certain positions, 
including skilled workers. The difference between 
localization rates in Chinese firms vs non-Chinese 
firms in Angola is statistically significant for the 
construction sector but not for the manufacturing 
sector. Heterogeneity within the sample of Chinese 
firms in Angola is substantial and greater than in 
Ethiopia, where the localization of the workforce 
is more uniform across companies. Particularly 
for the manufacturing sector in Angola we found 
both the lowest and the highest localization rates, a 
divergence that can be explained by a combination 
of reasons, including the time since production 
operations began (i.e. set-up stage), the type of 
technical skills needed, and corporate management 
preferences. In the case of non-Chinese firms there 
was also some variation, with 20% of firms reporting 
less than 85% localization, somewhat lower than 
expected for that segment of firms.9
The results of our own firm survey are broadly 
consistent with data shared by different Angolan 
government departments involved in public works, 
which suggest that Chinese contractors increased 
localization rates from 60% to 73% between 2011 
and 2014, according to data provided by the 
Angolan Road Authority. This increase in localization 
rates is the most important finding in relation to 
Angola. Most Chinese managers acknowledged a 
rapid change in recruitment patterns, with a move 
from localization rates of around 50% during the 
reconstruction boom (2002-10), to about 75% in 
2017. These figures are consistent with the range of 
localization rates, between 75% and 80%, we found 
in our survey. These trends are also consistent 
with comparisons between our survey results 
and estimates from studies of the pre-2010 years 
in Angola. For example, Tang (2010) reported an 
average localization rate of 60% across different 
sectors, but between 38% and 43% in more 
technically demanding infrastructure projects. Data 
from the Angolan Ministry of Finance on projects 
financed by the first two Chinese credit lines to 
Angola in 2004 and 2007 yield a range between 
56% and 64% of Angolan workers in the total 
workforce of construction projects (Corkin 2012). A 
number of respondents in Chinese firms pointed out 
that in the 2002-10 period some projects that had 
tight timelines might employ a majority of Chinese 
labourers, including in basic tasks, something that 
now is neither acceptable nor affordable. 
According to management interviews, the three 
main reasons for this important development were 
(a) the adaptation of these firms to the Angolan 
context, after more than 10 years in the market; (b) 
the larger pool of trained workers compared to the 
years after the end of the war, and (c) the growing 
costs and demands of Chinese expatriate labour. 
This is in line with evidence from other studies 
that have captured a similar pattern elsewhere, as 
discussed in Section 3.1.
These trends also translate into substantial 
contribution to direct job creation. As reported 
in Oya and Wanda (2019), data from the Angolan 
Ministry of Construction suggest that in the period 
2014-18 the share of new public work jobs created 
by Chinese firms ranged from 33% to 99% of all new 
jobs in this sector, with an average of 65% per year. 
Particularly during the period of crisis, after 2015, 
Chinese contractors were the main contributors of 
new jobs (whether casual or permanent) thanks to 
the emergency credit line approved in 2015. 
On balance, therefore, the primary 
data collected through firm surveys 
reveal that the contribution of Chinese 
firms to the creation of low-skilled and 
semi-skilled jobs for African workers 
and to the building of an industrial 
labour force has been sustained and 
substantial in the past 15 years in both 
Angola and Ethiopia. 
Localization rates have generally increased over 
time but still vary across the two countries due 
to the very different economic, policy and labour 
market contexts.
9 For example, according to our own interviews, three well-established Angolan road contractors employed 5%, 20%, and 30% of expat 
labour in 2016 respectively, with differences related to the relative scarcity of projects during that period and the particular technical 
needs of each project. 
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7 Labour force segmentation: 
who are the workers? 
The development of an industrial workforce 
and the incorporation of workers to new non-
agricultural sectors is an uneven and protracted 
process. Emerging workforces in construction and 
manufacturing are likely to be highly heterogeneous. 
Like many low- and middle-income countries, 
both Angola and Ethiopia have highly segmented 
labour markets that offer very different conditions of 
employment to different groups of workers.
We explore the characteristics of the new industrial 
and construction labour forces found in Angola and 
Ethiopia in the leading companies of these sectors. 
For this purpose we rely on two main sources of data: 
large-scale quantitative surveys and work life histories 
of workers. The main aspects that characterise and 
differentiate groups of workers in these sectors 
are (a) individual and household demographic 
characteristics, such as gender, age, household size 
and marital status; (b) migration and residential status; 
(c) education levels; and (d) socio-economic status.
By looking at these sets of characteristics we can 
distinguish different segments of the labour force 
surveyed in our study of leading firms operating in 
the infrastructure construction and manufacturing 
sectors. The nature and degree of segmentation vary 
substantially between Angola and Ethiopia, but in both 
countries evidence of segmentation is clear. Different 
factors matter to distinguish between different 
segments of the labour force in each country. 
These differences are driven by wider labour market 
structures, historical legacies, and the kinds of sectors 
and firms in which people work.
7.1 Angola: labour force characteristics and segmentation
The demographic composition of the sampled 
labour force in Angola suggests that construction 
and manufacturing workers are in the 20-35 age 
bracket and are mainly men. The presence of women 
in the construction and building materials sector in 
Angola is negligible, and our random sample barely 
found any women. 
Segmentation of the workforce is immediately 
visible in terms of age, despite the overall relative 
youthfulness of construction and industrial workers. 
In Angola, the average age was similar across 
sectors and, around 30 years, much higher than in 
Ethiopia. This difference is primarily explained by 
the large proportion of young women in Ethiopia’s 
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new factories. For Angola there were variations 
in terms of the skill group of workers and the 
origin of the firm. The youngest workers, with an 
average age of around 25 years, were low-skilled 
manufacturing workers in Chinese factories, 
many of whom were recent migrants from the 
Centre-South provinces of Angola, a point to 
which we return below. The oldest and also most 
experienced workers were found in Angolan 
factories and among semi-skilled construction 
and manufacturing workers in non-Chinese 
firms (see Table 7 for more details). These age 
differences between the two segments (Chinese 
vs non-Chinese companies) also translated into 
important contrasts for marital status, where 
the proportion of unmarried male workers was 
substantially higher in Chinese firms, especially 
in manufacturing. Therefore, basic demographic 
characteristics reveal a clear segmentation 
between workers employed by Chinese firms and 
workers in Angolan and other foreign companies, 
which is also reflected by contrasts in other 
variables, such as educational attainment and 
socio-economic status.
Education is often a primary source of labour market 
segmentation. Education levels in our samples vary 
greatly. In Angola, education levels split two distinct 
labour force segments in the survey: on the one 
hand, a group of more educated workers with more 
sector relevant work experience, mainly concentrated 
in Angolan and other foreign companies; on the 
other hand, a group of much less educated workers, 
usually migrants from rural areas, and with very limited 
relevant work experience and skills. Table 7 and Figure 
5 shows a stark contrast between workers in Chinese 
firms in both sectors and employees (many of whom 
are permanent workers) in Angolan and other foreign 
firms. In the former, workers tend to have only primary 
schooling, whereas in the latter the proportion of those 
who have completed lower secondary school and 
beyond is far greater. This is not simply a matter of age 
differences. Rather, these are different workforces in 
terms of education levels and qualifications. Compared 
to Chinese companies, leading Angolan and other 
foreign firms in both sectors were more demanding in 
terms of the minimum education levels required from 
workers and their labour force was more likely to be 
more experienced. 














Age 24.8 30.6 26.5 29.3 36.1 34 29.1
Never married (%) 45.2 22.6 0 14.3 3 8.5 27
Education (%)
None or primary incomplete 42.7 17 25 19.1 9.1 6.4 25.9
Primary (year 6) completed 43.6 39.6 50 47.6 30.3 38.3 40.8
Secondary (G9) or more
completed















Age 27.3 33.3 37.7 31.1 33.3 35.5 31.7
Never married (%) 27 12.1 3.3 12.5 8 11.9 15.2
Education (%)
None or primary incomplete 36.5 24.2 26.7 12.5 10.2 7.1 21.4
Primary (year 6) completed 46.1 39.4 43.3 37.5 21.6 52.4 38.8
Secondary (G9) or more
completed
17.5 36.3 30 50 68.2 40.5 39.9
Source: IDCEA survey, 2017
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Figure 5 - Contrasting education levels by firm ownership origin, Angola. 
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The results of the survey suggest many Angolan 
workers are internal migrants. Half the total sample 
in Angola reported having migrated for their 
current job. The contrasts by company origin are 
striking. The proportion of migrants in Chinese 
firms is around 70% in both sectors, compared 
to 29% for construction employees in Angolan 
companies, and only around 15-20% in the case 
of factory workers in both Angolan and other 
foreign firms. These are very significant differences 
that again confirm the existence of two separate 
workforces operating in different segments of the 
construction and manufacturing sectors in Angola. 
Moreover, we observe that Chinese firms not only 
hire a large proportion of migrant workers but also 
tend to reveal a preference for relying on migrant 
workers from the Centre-South of the country. 
Nearly 60% of the whole workforce in sampled 
Chinese firms, regardless of where interviews 
took place and in which sector, come from the 
Centre-South, and particularly from Huambo-Huila 
provinces, which are widely regarded as labour 
reservoirs in Angola (Figure 6). The proportion is 
even higher in factories. Many of the workers from 
these areas come from poor rural backgrounds.  
In part this reflects a stereotype, which has been 
internalized by Chinese managers, about workers 
from these areas being more hardworking and 
disciplined, and shows the priority accorded by these 
managers to labour control and discipline above other 
considerations. Indeed, the main complaints about 
Angolan workers raised by Chinese managers in both 
sectors were absenteeism, lateness, lack of work 
discipline, and theft. Chinese managers frequently 
raised high labour turnover as a major constraint on 
their training and localization efforts. Rather than 
considering whether working conditions were to 
blame, their understanding was that workers from 
certain places lacked the discipline and work ethic, 
a cliché that is all too common not only among 
Chinese managers but also more generally among 
foreign and even domestic investors (see also Tang 
and Eom, 2019). The migrant labour recruitment 
system, with its focus on the central and southern 
provinces of Angola, seems to be a direct response to 
these concerns. 
Workers with secondary schooling (>G9) or higher (%)
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A related particularity is that a large 
proportion of Chinese manufacturing 
firms located in Luanda operate a 
‘dormitory migrant labour regime’, 
 similar to experiences in parts of 
China’s Sunbelt  (Pun and Smith, 2007). 
Figure 7 below illustrates this pattern. 
Such a labour regime has two main consequences. 
First, it enhances labour control and discipline and 
helps firms count on a more reliable labour force 
where absenteeism and lateness is rare. Second, it 
creates space for lower wage demands from workers 
given that accommodation and food costs are 
covered, i.e. the additional ‘social wage’ meets the 
basic need of workers in the capital city Overall, 
the revealed preference for a ‘dormitory migrant 
labour regime’ in many Chinese firms in Angola 
does not simply reflect the adoption of labour 
practices that resemble the labour regimes in low-
wage sectors in China, but arises as a mechanism 
of adaptation to local labour market conditions and 
driven imperatives of labour control. This is then 
also possible because of the existence of ‘labour 
reservoirs’ in poorer provinces of the Centre-South 
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Figure 6 - Migration and workers’ origin in Angola’s industrial firms (%)
Figure 7 - Workers living in company dormitory in Angola by origin of firm (%)
Source: IDCEA survey, 2017
Source: IDCEA survey, 2017
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Given the differences in education levels and 
migrant origins it is not surprising the two labour 
force segments are also different in terms of socio-
economic status, or levels of poverty. We measure 
socio-economic status though a simple unweighted 
socio-economic index that scores higher the more 
basic commodities or non-food wage goods a 
worker owns (see more details in the country reports, 
Schaefer and Oya, 2019 and Oya and Wanda, 2019, 
and Sender, 2019, for a similar methodology for 
poverty proxies). Workers employed by Chinese 
firms are significantly poorer (with socio-economic 
index scores over 40% lower) than workers in other 
companies. These differences are not surprising as 
they reflect two basic facts about the samples: (a) 
sample biases in Angolan and other foreign firms, 
where the majority of workers belonged to a core 
permanent labour force, as opposed to Chinese firms 
where many workers, especially in construction, 
were still temporary and had been hired much more 
recently; (b) a large proportion of workers in Chinese 
firms were migrants or were hired in and from poorer 
areas of the country..
Differences in socio-economic status may also 
be important if they affect the quality of jobs for 
different segments of the labour force. Arguably 
poorer workers, in particular recent migrants from 
rural areas, may have lower reservation wages and 
more limited bargaining power, especially if they 
are new to industrial or construction jobs. They are 
also more likely to accept dormitory labour regime 
arrangements as their chances of finding adequate 
accommodation and afford to live in Luanda are slim.
In sum, there is substantial labour force 
segmentation in Angola that is strongly correlated 
with company origin, and we can therefore 
distinguish two distinct segments:
a) Poorer migrant workers with lower 
education levels and much less relevant 
sector work experience dominate the 
workforces in many Chinese firms in both 
construction and manufacturing;
b) A relatively higher-skilled segment 
of workers, with education levels 
above the average urban worker, 
and more work experience in 
construction and manufacturing, 
who are older and enjoy more stable 
work arrangements, is concentrated 
in Angolan and other foreign firms, 
especially in Angolan factories in Luanda 
and firms operating in a major dam project.
Understanding the existence of these structurally 
different labour force segments is essential to 
understanding the differences in labour outcomes 
that will be presented in Section 8.
7.2 Ethiopia: labour force characteristics and segmentation
In contrast to Angola, labour markets in 
construction and manufacturing in Ethiopia are 
highly gendered. Factories in Ethiopia employ 
predominantly women, especially for low-skilled 
jobs, where they represent nearly 80% of the 
samples of workers. This is partly to do with the 
kind of manufacturing that is emerging in Ethiopia: 
light labour-intensive industries where female 
labour participation tends to be high on a global 
scale. We also observe a higher presence of women 
in construction in Ethiopia compared to Angola, 
reflecting how gender norms with regard to 
employment vary across countries. Women’s labour 
force participation in Angola is overwhelmingly 
concentrated in agriculture and services, and, to a 
lesser extent, in public sector employment (which is 
part of the service sector).
In terms of basic demographic characteristics and 
especially age, there are important differences 
between companies of different origins, i.e. Chinese, 
other foreign and Ethiopian, for both low- and semi-
skilled workers. Among the low-skilled workers, 
employees of Ethiopian companies are much older 
than workers in Chinese or other foreign owned 
firms, where workers are very close to one another in 
average age, and also have markedly lower levels of 
education. While women form the majority of the low-
skilled labour force across all company types, this is 
most pronounced in other foreign firms (see Table 8).
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Like in Angola, differences in terms of education 
levels are also striking, but follow a different 
pattern, which is more sector-driven. Low-skilled 
construction workers have particularly low education 
levels, with 47% of such employees in Chinese 
firms, 50% in other foreign firms, and nearly 60% 
in Ethiopian firms not having completed primary 
education. By contrast, manufacturing workers 
tend to have at least some years of secondary 
education. The main differences for the latter can be 
found in contrasts between employees of Chinese 
and other foreign industrial firms, who are more 
educated than those employed by Ethiopian firms, 
the opposite result to the prevailing pattern in Angola. 
Age differences are an important driver of this gap, 














Age 21.7 22.4 29.8 24.6 24.3 36.7 25
Female (%) 71.5 91.7 72.3 15 82.1 50 75.3
Never married (%) 79.2 75.6 48.7 70 75 40 67.6
Education (%)
None or primary incomplete 10.4 12.5 34 5 3.57 1 16.8
Primary (year 8) completed 5.6 8.9 16.7 0 7.14 15 9.9














Age 24.3 27.7 24.8 27.7 29.7 33.8 26.9
Female (%) 10.5 25.7 33.7 0 0 0 15.2
Never married (%) 64.5 31.4 62.79 43.8 29.2 32.4 50.5
Education (%)
None or primary incomplete 47.2 50 59.32 16.7 20.8 40 41.5
Primary (year 8) completed 18.1 15.6 25.4 27.8 12.5 23.3 21.1
Year 10 or more completed 34.8 31.25 15.29 56.1 66.7 36.7 37.1
Table 8 - Demographic and education characteristics of workers by country, sector, and skill-group, Ethiopia
Source: IDCEA survey, 2017
In terms of socio-economic status, manufacturing 
workers are relatively better off, with a socio-
economic index score that was 28% higher than 
for construction workers. Many construction 
workers in the survey samples were locally hired 
in rural areas and had low education levels, 
limited experience and lower living standards. 
Within the manufacturing sector we find large 
differences between workers in Ethiopian firms, 
the best-off subset of the sample, and workers in 
Chinese and other foreign firms. This difference 
may also be related to the age difference and the 
longer industrial employment histories of workers 
employed in Ethiopian factories. 
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An important similarity with 
Angola is that a large segment 
of the labour force is constituted 
by internal migrants. 
However, there are distinct patterns that differentiate 
countries, sectors and types of workers. In Ethiopia, 
persistent un- and underemployment in many parts 
of the country, as well as low returns to labour 
in agriculture, make labour migration a common 
feature among young jobseekers in most areas of 
the country. Recent violent conflict in a number of 
areas inside Ethiopia have also led to large numbers 
of internally displaced people. All this is especially 
reflected in very high migration rates for jobs in 
factories (Figure 8). In the construction sector, 
migration patterns are related to the way in which 
road project are organised, which dictate hiring 
practices. Thus semi-skilled construction workers 
are more likely to migrate for their jobs and ‘move’ 
with the projects, because they have qualification 
and specialist skills to operate machinery. For all 
construction firms the proportion of semi-skilled 
workers who migrate ranges between 60% and 
over 80%. Slightly lower rates are found among 
manufacturing workers. Compared to Ethiopian firms, 
Chinese and other foreign manufacturing companies 
employ higher rates of migrants. This pattern reflects 
the predominance of Chinese and other foreign 
firms in industrial parks, which attract large numbers 
of migrants in search of work, partly driven by local 
government agencies that actively support such 
recruitment. All of the Ethiopian companies we 
surveyed were located in or near large population 
centres, which made it easier for Ethiopian firms to 
hire locally.
However, an important difference with Angola is 
the absence, at least at the time of the survey, of a 
‘dormitory labour regime’. Furthermore, the share of 
migrants among low-skilled workers in construction 
was also relatively lower. According to interviews with 
company management and government officials, 
these facts are associated with policy priorities. First, 
firms were under pressure from central and sub-
national authorities to create jobs for local workers 
in construction projects, which limited the extent 
to which they could ‘travel’ with large numbers of 
low-skilled workers from other regions. Second, the 
government discouraged the building of dormitories 
inside industrial parks despite the fact that the vast 
majority of workers were migrants, and some came 
from relatively long distances and therefore needed 
accommodation. There was expectation that workers 
could find suitable private accommodation in the 
vicinity of parks and that this would protect their 
freedom from employers’ excessive control over 
their lives and time if they had been housed inside 
factories. However, as discussed in section on wages, 
housing costs have become a significant problem 
for many workers in industrial parks, eroding the 
purchasing power of their wages and contributing to 
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Figure 8 - Migration for current job by sector, skill level and firm ownership in Ethiopia (%)
Source: IDCEA survey, 2017
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8 Labour outcomes: wages and working 
conditions in comparative perspective 
This section presents the main set of findings 
regarding working conditions. The primary focus 
is on wages and their determinants. We provide 
detailed evidence on whether origin of firms matters 
or not, and, if so, why. Drawing on the second level 
of analysis of the labour regime configuration, 
we discuss the role of sector specificity in wage 
determination. This analysis is complemented by 
a descriptive analysis of other non-wage working 
conditions, issues of collective action, and structural 
impediments to better conditions. The section also 
reports on patterns of training provision and their 
effects. In order to understand variation in working 
conditions it is important to bear in mind the 
observed differences between labour force  
segments described in Section 7.
8.1 Job security and formality
We found substantial differences between Angola 
and Ethiopia in terms of the levels of formality and 
job security. Some of these differences were due 
to sample bias in some of the non-Chinese firms in 
Angola, where only the core permanent workforce 
was captured, as discussed in Section 4. We assess 
formality by looking at whether workers are in a direct 
employment relationship with the companies they 
work for, or whether they are subject to brokerage. 
We also look at whether workers have a written 
contract, and whether, in the absence of a written 
contract, workers have had key aspects of the implicit 
contract explained to them verbally.
We find that in both countries direct 
employment relationships prevail. 
The vast majority of workers report being employed 
directly by the sampled company. Complex 
subcontracting systems and reliance on labour 
intermediaries/brokers or agencies are not common 
among large companies in these countries. This 
contrasts with practices in other regions of the world, 
and especially in China and India, where the role 
of labour brokers and informal labour relations is 
conspicuous, especially in the construction sector 
(Swider, 2015; Lerche et al., 2017).
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In Ethiopia levels of formality, measured by the 
prevalence of written contracts, differ greatly by 
sector. Workers in construction are in less formal 
labour arrangements than manufacturing workers. 
Especially low-skilled construction workers are 
frequently hired on a temporary basis from the 
local area around the project site. Engagement 
can be for the entire project length, a portion 
thereof, such as the phases that require greater 
labour inputs, or even just for the duration of a 
specific task. Thus, looking across all firm origins, 
65% of construction workers report having no 
written contract, in contrast to factory workers, 
a majority of whom (69%) do have a written 
contract. While most construction workers (60%) 
without a written contract had key elements of 
their contract verbally explained, fully 25% of our 
total construction sample in Ethiopia was working 
without a clear contractual relationship. In the 
Ethiopian construction sector there were no clear 
differences   by company origin. 
This is in sharp contrast with Angola, where the 
availability of written contracts is more correlated 
with the origin of the firm and less with the sector. 
Workers in Chinese firms in both sectors were 
less likely to have a written contract. Overall 
the proportion of low-skilled employees with a 
written contract was low, at 35% for both sectors 
combined, in contrast with 76% of the Angolan 
semi-skilled workers in the survey, the sub-group 
for which awareness of a written contract was 
greatest. So, part of the difference between firms 
by origin is driven by a much larger proportion of 
low-skilled workers in Chinese firms compared to 
non-Chinese firms, and particularly to Angolan 
manufacturing enterprises where the sample 
consisted primarily of semi-skilled permanent 
workers. We observed that many workers hired 
by medium-sized Chinese-owned factories in 
Luanda had no ID cards and were therefore 
‘informally’ recruited. Under formal labour 
arrangements, and certainly in most ‘formal’ 
enterprises, employers require ID cards in order 
to hire workers and sign contracts. Many migrant 
workers from more remote parts of Angola 
declared that they did not have ID cards and that 
the process to obtain them was cumbersome. 
There might be other reasons but these were 
not reported. Although workers without ID cards 
were clearly aware of the terms of their labour 
relationship with their employers, they did not 
have a written contract or were not aware of one. 
This group of workers explains a large part of the 
difference between Chinese and non-Chinese firms 
in our Angolan samples.
More significantly for the purposes of our 
comparative analysis, there are important 
differences in terms of job tenure and work 
experience within each country and by origin 
of firm (see Table 9 and 10). In Ethiopia, workers 
employed by Ethiopian enterprises had been in the 
job much longer than workers in Chinese and other 
foreign firms, especially in manufacturing. In Angola 
we find a similar pattern, but the contrast lies 
between Chinese firms on the one hand, where job 
tenure was shorter, and Angolan and other foreign 
companies on the other hand, where workers had 
longer tenures, particularly in manufacturing. The 
average tenure of workers in Angolan and other 
foreign firms is more than double that of workers in 
Chinese companies (Table 10). The lack of tenure 
is particularly acute for the bottom half of the 
sample of construction workers in Chinese firms, 
who had only been working for between one and 
four months since they were first hired. In short, 




Other foreign / 
Angolan 
Chinese
Other foreign / 
Angolan 
Chinese
Mean 2.6 1.4 5.8 2.0
Table 10 - Job tenure by sector and ownership, Angola
Source: IDCEA survey, 2017
The wages paid to workers depend on a number of 
factors, including the productivity of workers as well 
as the structural and associational power they are 
able to bring to bear on wage negotiations (Silver, 
2003). Both productivity and workers’ bargaining 
power are determined in part by the sector in which 
the company is active. We therefore make all wage 
comparisons within sectors, or control for the  
sector of activity. We first compare wages across 
different skill groups, before we turn to a comparison 
of wages across different company origins. Due to 
the substantial differences between both national 
economies, data for Angola and Ethiopia are 
analysed separately.
8.2.1 Wages in Angola
Semi-skilled workers enjoy a large wage premium 
in both countries, though the difference between 
the construction and manufacturing sectors is 
much more pronounced in Ethiopia than in Angola 
(compare Figure 9 and Figure 11). Looking across both 
sectors in Angola, semi-skilled workers received on 
average 64,805kz, compared to 30,157kz per month 
for low-skilled workers.10 The differences by sector are 
10 In purchasing power parity (PPP) $ terms these salaries were equivalent to $633 and $295 respectively (exchange rate of 102.40kz/
PPPUS$ at time of survey). The PPP conversion factor (or exchange rate) takes differences in price levels between countries into account. 





Ethiopian Chinese Other 
foreign
Ethiopian
Job tenure (years) 1.4 1 2.6 1.1 1.5 7.5
Table 9 - Job tenure by sector and ownership, Ethiopia
Source: IDCEA survey, 2017
several workers in a number of Chinese road building 
sites had been recently recruited in nearby villages. 
These were new jobs. The differences in job tenure 
in Angola are also associated with large differences in 
the years of experience workers had accumulated in 
relevant sectors (i.e. construction and manufacturing). 
Our data shows that the relevant work experience of 
workers in Angolan and other foreign construction 
companies was nearly double that of employees in 
Chinese firms. Manufacturing workers in Chinese 
firms barely had any prior relevant work experience 
in factories, less than 6 months on average, and the 
bottom 50% of such workers had no relevant prior 
experience at all (see Oya and Wanda, 2019). These 
results are consistent with the evidence on labour 
force segmentation presented in the previous section.
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Figure 9 - Monthly wages by sector and skillgroup, Angola (Kz)
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Source: IDCEA survey, 2017
The answer to the question whether firm origin 
matters for wage levels depends on several factors and 
results are generally mixed. We first start by observing 
simple differences in means without considering 
other confounding factors. This is however only the 
initial step in understanding wage differentials and we 
complement this simple descriptive analysis with more 
statistical analysis below. 
In Angola, wages paid in Chinese firms tend to be 
lower on average for some categories of workers, but 
there is significant variation. We find differences for two 
out of four categories of workers. Monthly wages paid 
by Angolan and other foreign firms were, on average, 
roughly one third higher than wages in Chinese 
companies for low-skilled workers in construction and 
for semi-skilled workers in manufacturing (Figure 10). 
For the latter there is no difference between Chinese 
and other foreign firms, while the sampled workers 
in Angolan factories (who were mostly part of the 
permanent labour force) receive higher wages. On 
the other hand, we did not find statistically significant 
differences for two groups of workers: semi-skilled 
workers in construction and low-skilled factory 
employees (Figure 10). 
Given the observed heterogeneity in the composition 
of labour forces across firms by origin, as well as 
the sample bias discussed in Section 4, these simple 
comparisons are insufficient to draw firm conclusions 
about differences between Chinese and other 
companies. The descriptive differences are also not 
sufficiently large to conclude they are statistically 
meaningful. Therefore, it is important to consider the 
confounding factors that underpin these observed 
differences. One such factor is the existence of a sub-
sample of workers in Angolan and other foreign firms 
employed in the country’s flagship infrastructure 
project, where we find the ‘top benchmark’ of wages 
and working conditions. Workers in this dam project 
were part of a high-quality workforce (regardless 
of skill group) particularly selected by companies for 
this project. Many of these workers had long work 
experience in the sector and had been working for the 
contractors in previous projects before. The effects 
of this factor partly affect the differences observed 
in the boxplot representation of wage differences for 
low-skilled construction workers. The other key factor 
is related to sampling frames: the predominance of 
recently and locally hired labourers in Chinese road 
building sites in contrast with the predominant ‘core’ 
not that clear-cut, with relatively similar premiums 
paid to semi-skilled workers in both sectors (Figure 
9). This reflects the fact that there are some 
similarities and connections between the work 
performed by semi-skilled operators in building 
material factories and those in construction. The 
salaries received by semi-skilled workers in both 
sectors are quite high compared to average wages 
in the sector. One would also expect wages to be 
higher for low-skilled construction workers compared 
to factory workers, but this is not the case. Instead, 
we observe similar wage levels across both sectors, 
due to the higher living costs of Luanda (where all 
factory workers were based) and the concentration of 
construction workers in other provinces near the road 
or dam building sites. In other words, location effects 
also affect these comparisons.
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Source: IDCEA survey, 2017
Figure 10 - Monthly cash wages by firm ownership, sector and skillgroup, Angola (kz)
permanent labour force found in other firms. In other 
words, the different sampling frames and workforces 
present at the time of surveys explain part of the 
observed differences in the construction samples, 
especially for low-skilled workers. Finally, the 
adoption of a ‘dormitory labour regime’ where some 
basic expenses are paid by the Chinese employer 
may also contribute to lower monthly cash wages 
for some of these workers, especially for semi-skilled 
industrial employees.
As for differences among semi-skilled manufacturing 
workers, the sample for workers in Chinese firms is too 
small to draw dependable conclusions, but it is clear 
that the sample of workers in Angolan factories was 
drawn from a group of core permanent workers with 
much longer job tenure. Besides sampling issues, wage 
differences are driven by the different characteristics 
of the labour force, i.e. the fact that workers in Chinese 
firms seem to be part of a different segment of labour 
supply, as argued in Section 7. 
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To go beyond the descriptive analysis presented 
so far we use regression analysis to help us unpack 
the combinations of determinants that affect wage 
variation. We use OLS regressions with either robust 
standard errors or standard errors clustered at firm 
level and control for a range of individual and firm 
characteristics, including age, gender, educational 
background, job tenure, work experience, migrant 
status, sector of operation, firm size, location effects, 
type of infrastructure project (dam vs road) and 
for specific sampling frame characteristics. Our 
dependent variable across all specifications is the log 
of monthly wages (in Kz).
The full results of the regression analysis are 
presented in Appendix A and are discussed in more 
detail in our Angola country report (Oya and Wanda 
2019). The analysis suggests that, other things 
being equal, the particularities of each segment of 
labour force impact on average wage levels. The 
concentration of poorer rural migrants in Chinese 
firms is captured by the socio-economic index 
variable in the regression model, which reduces 
and practically eliminates the partial effect of being 
employed by a Chinese firm instead of an Angolan 
or other foreign firm. The statistical significance 
of the fact of being employed by a Chinese firm 
also disappears when we use clustered standard 
errors, which provide better estimates of variation, 
considering sampling methods at firm level.
The other variables that have a greater effect on 
wages than the origin of the firm are: 
• whether a worker is semi-skilled (+) 
• socio-economic status proxy (+)
• job tenure (+)
• relevant work experience (+) 
• employment scale (+)
• working at dam construction (+)
• whether part of a core permanent labour force (+)
• having migrated (+)
Therefore, the particular individual 
characteristics of workers, including 
their job tenure, work experience, 
education and socio-economic status, 
combined with sector, skill-level of jobs 
and sample frame issues help us explain 
a significant proportion of variation 
in nominal wages, whereas the origin 
of a firm does not have a significant 
independent effect. 
Arguably, part of the observed segmentation is driven 
by recruitment preferences and practices among 
firms, and Chinese firms may specifically target types 
of workers who have lower reservation wages. The 
reason they opt for a migrant quasi-dormitory labour 
regime, however, may lie less in the ability to pay 
lower wages and more in questions of labour control 
and discipline, as argued in the previous section.
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8.2.2 Wages in Ethiopia
In Ethiopia, there are also substantial differences 
in wages by skill-group across the construction 
and manufacturing sectors (see Figure 11). 
Average monthly wages for low-skilled workers 
in construction range between ETB1,500 and 
ETB1,700, whereas in manufacturing they range 
between ETB1,250 and ETB1,450.11 The wage 
premium for semi-skilled workers is particularly high 
in the construction sector. Semi-skilled construction 
workers have comparatively rare skills, which require 
years of training and in some cases certification in 
the form of particular licences, e.g. for construction 
machine operators. Several managers reported 
that there had been an increase in the number 
of machine operators for road construction but 
competition for more experienced workers was 
still strong, so some firms opted to offer higher 
‘efficiency’ wages to attract and retain the most 
experienced and competent semi-skilled workers. 
These workers, also due to these much higher 
wages, are more likely to follow the firm from 
project to project and be less prone to leave.
As shown in Figure 12, the main differences in 
wages paid by firms of different origins are also very 
dependent on the sector in which firms operate and 
the skill level of the workers. In the manufacturing 
sector, low-skilled workers in both Chinese and 
other foreign firms are paid less than in Ethiopian 
companies. Among semi-skilled manufacturing 
workers other foreign companies pay the lowest 
wages, though these differences are not statistically 
significant. In the construction sector, low-skilled 
workers in Ethiopian companies receive the highest 
average wages, while the difference between the 
wages of workers in Chinese and other foreign 
companies is not statistically significant, given wide 
dispersion in wages in other foreign companies. 
At a simple descriptive level workers in Chinese 
firms are on average paid somewhat less than 
counterparts in other foreign and Ethiopian firms. As 
discussed above for the case of Angola, these simple 
descriptive differences do not take into account 
a range of variables that affect wages besides the 
origin of a firm.
11 Equivalent In purchasing power parity (PPP) $ terms respective ranges of $161-182 and $134-155 (exchange rate of ETB 9.33/PPPUS$ 
at time of survey). In terms of market exchange rate, the monthly wages are equivalent to ranges of $63-71 (construction) and $52-61 
(manufacturing) respectively (exchange rate of ETB 23.9/US$ at time of survey). Semi-skilled worker salaries in construction were much 
















Figure 11 - Monthly wages by firm sector and skillgroup, Ethiopia (ETB)
Source: IDCEA survey, 2017
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As above we perform regression analysis to explore 
the main determinants of wage variation and whether 
differences by origin of firm persist after controlling 
for other observable factors or not. Our dependent 
variable across all specifications is the log of monthly 
wages in ETB. For the full regression results please 
see Appendix B. In our preferred specification, which 
uses clustered standard errors, there are a number of 
variables with statistically significant effects on wages, 
especially individual worker attributes:
• Whether semi-skilled (+)
• Male (+)
• Schooling (+)
• Job tenure (+)
• Work experience (+)
• Migrant (+)
• Socio-economic status index (+)
• Location effects, especially sited in industrial park (-)
• Construction sector (+)
If we only consider individual worker 
attributes, average wages in Chinese 
firms are still slightly lower, but once we 
consider location effects and especially 
whether companies are located in an 
industrial park, the independent effect 
of the origin of the firm is no longer 
statistically significant. 
The fact that wages are lower in industrial parks, 
other things being equal, has to do with a number of 
possible explanatory factors. First and foremost is the 
nature of industrial parks as particular spaces of wage 
setting and labour control, which in turn results in 
part from their integration into particular, and highly 
demanding, global production networks, as explained 
in our Ethiopia country report (Schaefer and Oya 
2019). Workers located in an industrial park, receive 
wages that are almost 19% lower than those that do 
not. Second, some of this difference is also due to a 
location effect, as most workers sampled in industrial 
Source: IDCEA survey, 2017
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park worked in areas outside Addis Ababa, while most 
Ethiopian manufacturing firms, where wages were 
higher, were mainly located within Addis perimeter. 
Third, the experience of firms in the Ethiopian market 
matters too, as many of the sampled foreign firms in 
industrial parks had recently begun operations, and 
in some cases only a few months before the survey, 
therefore at initial stages when labour productivity is 
especially low.
Qualitative interviews with workers and managers 
suggested that problems with high turnover and low 
retention rates as well as high absenteeism were linked 
to the perception of low wages on the part of workers. 
Many of these workers had only limited experience 
in factory work and a significant sub-sample of them 
were in industrial park firms in their early stages 
of operations and therefore functioning at low 
productivity levels. There is now some consensus that 
the starting levels of wages in new industrial parks were 
too low (at the time of the survey) and there is evidence 
that most companies have increased wages in the 
past two years in order to tackle labour recruitment 
and retention difficulties. It is still too early to say 
whether these changes are having a lasting effect on 
employment stability in the industrial parks.
The absence of a minimum wage may have 
contributed to low starting wages especially in more 
recent industrial parks. The absence of an adequate 
benchmark, the limited information of real living costs 
in areas around industrial parks, and the assumption 
that such a large pool of potential workers would 
keep wages low all contributed to this problematic 
low-wage scenario. Several factory managers, and 
indeed representatives of brands sourcing from these 
parks, were in favour of a minimum wage, precisely 
to avoid these problems and have some ‘proof’ that 
basic ILO labour standards were respected. However, 
the government has been up until now reluctant to 
commit to an official minimum wage. There was a 
perception among some officials that a minimum wage 
could be a deterrent to foreign investors, something 
that was not really consistent with information from 
management interviews. 
A more plausible reason is the complexity of agreeing 
on a national minimum wage that could work for 
everyone. Given the vast heterogeneity in working 
conditions across sectors and types of firms, a 
minimum wage that was too low might be irrelevant 
to foreign investors in industrial parks. On the other 
hand, a minimum wage set at a level consistent with 
practices in export-oriented manufacturing might be 
too high for the bulk of small and medium entreprises 
in other sectors. At the time of writing, a new Labour 
Law draft had been approved by Parliament but there 
was no announcement of a minimum wage, rather the 
establishment of a mechanism to assess the pertinence 
and level of prospective minimum wages. Given the 
diversity of sectors, firms and therefore jobs, it would 
certainly make sense to stipulate different minimum 
wages for different purposes, and especially for spaces/
sectors where foreign investors need meaningful 
national benchmarks.
8.2.3 Wages and living costs in Angola
The previous section has focused on comparisons of 
wages by sector, skill-group and origin of firm. These 
comparisons do not, however, tell us whether the 
wages are high or low relative to existing conventions 
and workers’ living costs. 
As noted above, a common stipulation applied to 
several global framework agreements12 by leading 
brands, states that wages must be above the statutory 
relevant minimum wage in the producing country. 
In Angola the average wage across all sampled firms 
was substantially higher than the stipulated 18,754kz 
national minimum wage for construction and 
manufacturing at the time of our survey in 2016/17. 
On average, the group of lowest paid workers, i.e. 
low-skilled construction workers operating on some 
Chinese road sites, many in rural areas of the centre 
of Angola, earned around 25,000kz, one third higher 
than the minimum wage. Only temporary labourers 
hired in local areas surrounding road construction 
sites for the early phases of a road rehabilitation 
project were paid salaries that were close to, but 
12 See examples in http://www.industriall-union.org/issues/confronting-global-capital/global-framework-agreements
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nevertheless always above, the sector minimum 
wage. As pointed out in several qualitative interviews, 
however, these wages, even for the lowest paid 
workers, were higher (and more stable) than what 
many casual workers earn in the urban informal 
sectors, especially in petty trade. In fact, particularly 
the poorest workers in our samples seemed to 
welcome earning a stable monthly income at a higher 
level than what they used to earn before in irregular 
informal work. 
Besides comparisons with a minimum wage, an 
important question is whether wages are high 
enough to ensure that workers are not living in 
poverty. Indeed some IndustryAll Global Framework 
Agreements with brands, as cited above, do refer 
that wages should always be enough to meet at least 
the basic needs of workers and their families. To 
understand the commodity bundle a particular cash 
wage can purchase it is useful to adjust wages to 
take account of local purchasing power. Commonly, 
such adjustments are undertaken using so-called 
purchasing power parity (PPP) adjustment factors, 
which take differences in price levels between 
countries into account. The international poverty line 
of $1,90 a day in PPP terms would mean a monthly 
income of about $58 and the next poverty line of 
$3.20 (for middle income countries) would imply a 
monthly income of around $96. In the Angola sample 
wages in PPP terms range between the lowest found 
among low-skilled workers in some Chinese firms 
(25,000 kz, i.e. $244 in PPP terms) and the highest 
average found among semi-skilled workers in 
Angolan factories (73,000 kz, or $713 in PPP terms).13 
Most low-skilled workers in our Angola sample earn 
wages above $300 in PPP terms. These wage levels 
confirm that Angola’s labour market is characterized 
by comparatively high wages when using PPP 
exchange rates, which also reflect the high living 
costs in the country. In these terms, they are certainly 
not ‘poverty wages’.
Nonetheless, even when wages are above 
international poverty lines and higher than 
remuneration in the lowest paid informal activities 
in any given country, workers may still perceive 
that wage levels are low in relation to their living 
costs. In fact, in many interviews most workers in 
both countries complained that the wages they 
received were not sufficient to cover their monthly 
expenditures. However, there are some striking 
and paradoxical differences between the two main 
segments of the labour force in Angola. As shown 
in Table 11, the lower paid workers in Chinese firms, 
especially low-skilled workers, actually managed to 
save money, in contrast with workers employed by 
Angolan and other foreign firms, whose monthly cash 
wages were higher for both skill categories. This result 
reflects the existence of a ‘dormitory labour regime’ 
in many Chinese firms in both construction and 
manufacturing, which adds accommodation and food 
provision as a ‘social wage’, and therefore significantly 
reduces the monthly expenses workers incur. This is 
especially important for Luanda-based workers, who 
face high living costs, particularly for housing, food 
and transport. In the case of low-skilled workers in 
Angolan and other foreign firms, their wages, despite 
being higher than the sample average, are not enough 
to cover all these expenses, and these workers are 
the only category with negative savings. This does 
not necessarily mean that workers in Chinese firms 
are better off. In part their lower monthly expenses 
are due to a frugal lifestyle, and not just to the fact 
of having free accommodation and food, whereas 
workers employed by other firms may have a slightly 
higher standard of living which their wages barely 
allow them to sustain. 
In sum, the paradox is that although 
on average Chinese firms pay lower 
wages for two out of four categories 
of workers, they are employing poorer 
workers with less education and 
experience and complementing their 
salaries with a ‘social wage’ consisting 
of accommodation and food, which 
allows these workers to keep their 
expenditure lower than most other 
workers and save money for the family 
back in the villages. 
This finding is significant because of its implications 
for labour regime configuration and the evidence 
of poverty reduction. While employing relatively 
13 The 2017 PPP conversion factor for private consumption in Angola was Kz 102 to $1 (PPP).
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poor workers through a ‘dormitory labour regime’ 
may enhance employer’s labour control and take 
advantage of the low bargaining power of these 
workers, it is also true that these firms are creating 
jobs for some of the most vulnerable labour market 
entrants in Angola. These are workers with very 
limited employment opportunities in their areas of 
origin, where low-return small-scale agriculture and 
insecure and poorly remunerated urban services 
may constitute their only chances of survival. 
As many workers in this situation reported, after 
finding these jobs, they enjoyed a stable monthly 
income for their first time since they entered the 
labour market. Thus, the combination of these 
relatively lower cash wages and the ‘social wage’ of 
accommodation and food seemed to contribute to 
their escape from poverty.
8.2.4 Wages and living costs in Ethiopia
As noted above, in Ethiopia there is no official 
minimum wage, so it is not possible to compare 
reported wages with such a basic convention. The 
lack of a statutory minimum wage has contributed 
to low starting wages in new industrial parks, as 
both government and new investors were assuming 
relatively low wages would still be enough to attract 
poor migrant workers. Some managers mentioned 
that the lowest wages were above the national 
poverty line, which is used for individuals only and 
as a measure of extreme poverty. Therefore, the 
national poverty line is not a good benchmark for 
firms willing to pay ‘living wages’. 
We probe this and compare estimated wages to the 
relevant international poverty lines, like we do for 
Angola. We find that, in PPP terms, no workers in the 
Ethiopian sample earn less than the $3.20 poverty 
line and all workers earn more than twice as much 
as $1.90 per day, which is the reference for poorer 
countries. Low-skilled manufacturing workers earn 
between $130 - $155 per month in PPP terms, 
while low-skilled construction workers are paid 
between $161 and $187 in PPP terms.14 Semi-skilled 
workers range between $227 and $324 per month 
in manufacturing, and between $447 and $662 
in construction, again in PPP terms. In short, they 
are not technically ‘poverty wages’ as it has been 
frequently claimed.
However, this does not mean sampled workers 
considered wages to be sufficient to cover living 
costs. Unlike in Angola, in Ethiopia there is no such 
clear contrast by origin of firm, as Chinese firms 
there do not generally practice a ‘dormitory labour 
regime’, so most workers face similar patterns of 
expenditure. For most respondents in Ethiopia food 
is the largest expenditure item, with 56% estimating 
the food share of their monthly expenditure at 
more than half of the their total expenditure, of 
whom 20% report that they spend three-quarters 
of their income on food. Despite the high share 
of food in total monthly expenditure, half of our 
respondents in Ethiopia report that they do not 
consume meat or dairy products on a weekly 
basis. In the manufacturing sector, just 27% of 
14 The 2017 PPP conversion factor for private consumption in Ethiopia was ETB 9.33 to $1 (PPP). 
Table 11 - Monthly wages and living costs: purchasing power of wages in Angola 
Net cash wage after 
montly expenses - kz
Monthly expenses 
in % of wage
Monthly wage (kz)
Low-skilled workers in Angolan/OF firms -881 110% 35.250
Low-skilled workers in Chinese firms 8.130 73% 27.659
Semi-skilled workers in Angolan/OF firms 12.318 93% 66.540
Semi-skilled workers in Chinese firms 16.197 77% 59.284
Source: IDCEA survey, 2017
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15 For the only available estimate of a ‘living wage’ in Ethiopia see Melese (2015).
8.3 Non-wage working conditions
In Angola, we find that differences between the 
construction and manufacturing sectors are 
relatively modest, while Chinese firms seem to 
offer fewer benefits than firms of other origins. 
Less than half of all workers, across both skill 
groups, benefit from a range of benefits usually 
associated with formal labour relations (Figure 
13). Almost all workers do have access to meals at 
work though, especially in factories. The provision 
of transport allowances depends on workplace 
characteristics, whether it is a road construction 
site with locally hired workers, a factory, or a 
workplace with a dormitory. Looking across 
firm origins, survey results for Angola confirm 
significant differences between Chinese and 
other firms. The sample of workers in Chinese 
firms in both construction and manufacturing 
are characterised by more informal relations, 
especially for low-skilled workers, which translates 
into a lower likelihood of receiving paid leave, paid 
medical assistance or access to a social security 
card, i.e. formal incorporation into the national 
social security system (for pensions, for example). 
Qualitative interviews with company managers 
confirmed that in many Chinese firms there was no 
awareness that workers expected these rights to be 
fulfilled, especially considering that the workforce 
was employed on comparatively informal terms 
and on fixed-term contracts. We found cases where 
firms had formally incorporated ‘dormitory’ workers 
in the social security system, but workers had either 
not been informed or had not received the card. It 
was therefore difficult to establish to what extent 
some of these entitlements were provided, but 
many workers certainly seemed unaware.
Despite the different degrees of informality across 
groups of firms, a striking finding is that virtually no 
workers reported payment delays, an issue that is 
common in more exploitative forms of employment. 
An aspect that is frequently mentioned in reports 
on poor working conditions in China and Chinese 
firms more broadly is the incidence of accidents and 
work-related injuries. The results of our survey do 
not confirm this expectation in Angola (Figure 14). 
In fact, the overall the incidence of any kind of work 
related injury or health problem was higher in non-
Chinese firms. In addition, in Chinese firms fewer 
workers reported having witnessed a colleague 
being seriously injured. This is despite the fact that 
across a range of indicators of health and safety 
(H&S) Chinese firms usually performed worse, as in 
the frequency of H&S training, the provision of first 
aid facilities, the presence of a safety officer, and the 
use of safety clothes.  
8.3.1 Non-wage working conditions in Angola
The firms we examined differ greatly in terms of 
the non-wage working they offer their employees. 
In this section we look at the provision of fringe 
benefits, including meals, transport and medical care, 
as well as at interactions between managers and 
workers in the workplace. As with other aspects 
of the employment relationship we find marked 
differences between Angola and Ethiopia, but each 
country context will be analysed separately. 
low-skilled workers and 41% of semi-skilled workers 
state that their earnings are sufficient to cover their 
monthly cost of living. The situation is a little better 
in the construction sector, but still only 42% of low-
skilled construction workers report sufficient monthly 
incomes. Semi-skilled workers construction are the 
most secure group in terms of livelihoods and 75% 
report sufficient earnings. Therefore, sampled 
workers may not be in a situation of extreme 
poverty and receive a stable income above poverty 
lines, but many seem to struggle to make ends 
meet. Their main perception is that by and large, 
wages are not at the level of a ‘living wage’, which 
should sustain a family of four or five.15
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Source: IDCEA survey, 2017
Figure 13 - Selected non-wage benefits by sector in Angola











































Figure 14 - Workers reporting work-related accidents 
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8.3.2 Non-wage working conditions in Ethiopia
In Ethiopia, there were stark differences between the 
construction and manufacturing sectors in terms of 
fringe benefits (see Table 12). 
Workers in the manufacturing sector 
are much more likely to receive fringe 
benefits such as paid holidays, paid sick 
leave, or clean showers, and have better 
access medical care and health checks. 
However, there is also substantial variation by 
firm origin within each sector. In the construction 
sector Chinese firms appear to offer the fewest 
benefits to their employees. Workers at Chinese 
construction firms have less access paid holidays, 
health checks, medical care and sick leave, compared 
to their counterparts in other foreign and Ethiopian 
companies. In the manufacturing sector, these 
differences are somewhat less pronounced. Here, 
Ethiopian firms perform best across most categories 
of service provision, followed by other foreign 
and Chinese firms. However, Chinese firms do 
outperform other foreign firms and Ethiopian firms 
in some categories, in particular the provision of 
meals and accommodation, although the latter is 
rare across all firm types. This is partly a strategy 
to help with labour retention, and especially to 
maintain work discipline and time efficiency, as 
reported by many managers. The provision of 
high-calorie food was considered very important 
by many Chinese managers as a way of improving 
workers’ productivity and efficiency. It was expected 
that well-fed workers in factory canteens were 
more likely to sustain the pressures of high-pace 
production lines and less likely to fall ill and be 
absent. This has also been increasingly flagged 
by government officials as a desirable practice, 
given the low nutrition levels of some of the most 
vulnerable workers.
Table 12 - Non-wage working conditions by sector and firm origin, Ethiopia 











Meals 4.9 0 2.5 84.8 64.3 13.1
Accomodation (or allowance) 19.4 13.6 16 7.4 0.5 2
Transport (or allowance) 71.8 55.9 88.3 82.8 74.9 54.2
Paid holidays 12.9 33.9 21.9 72.5 76.2 88
Health checks at workplace 1.7 18.6 19.3 24.1 42.8 44.9
Medical care 13 39 52.9 30.3 58.7 70.1
Paid sick leave 22.8 35.6 41.2 54 64.4 89.2
Clean showers   10.5 11.9 18.5   39.8 27.7 39.3
Source: IDCEA survey, 2017
The provision of accommodation was substantially 
less likely than in Angola. In part, this reflected a policy 
preference for avoiding factory dormitories, as noted 
in section 7.2. The government initially discouraged 
companies from building dormitories and housing 
workers inside industrial parks. However, during the 
time of the survey and especially in 2018, when we 
conducted several interviews with managers and 
government officials, it was clear that housing had 
become a major problem and a reason for unexpected 
challenges in recruiting and retaining labour, especially 
in new industrial parks, which did not benefit from 
adequate surrounding urban eco-systems. Thus, 
many migrant workers faced higher than expected 
living costs, especially because of housing, and 
consistently complained about their wages going to 
pay for the housing and food that they did not require 
to pay for before migrating. Provision of affordable 
and subsidized housing, whether from companies, 
industrial parks or local government has become 
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a critical issue and a policy priority for the success 
of new industrial parks. The planned expansion of 
employment in these parks, with thousands of more 
migrant workers in need for accommodation, leaves 
little alternative choice. Chinese firm managers were 
certainly in favour of providing free accommodation to 
confront problems of absenteeism, lateness, discipline 
and indeed labour retention.
Finally, like Angola, the record in 
terms of safety seems to be better in 
Chinese firms, especially compared to 
Ethiopian companies. 
Across sectors accidents and injuries are 
somewhat more frequent in construction, 
while comparisons by firm origin suggest that 
occupational hazard is slightly lower in Chinese 
firms compared to other firms, particularly to 
Ethiopian firms. For example, construction 
workers in Chinese and other foreign companies 
report having suffered injury following an 
accident during the last 12 months at very similar 
rates, 4% and 3% respectively, but reported 
accident-related injury rates are much higher in 
Ethiopian companies, where 14% of workers have 
been injured by an accident at work.
8.4 Labour relations, conflict and institutions
The state of labour relations and labour market 
institutions, including trade unions, is determined 
by both the country and the sector in which a 
firm operates. Overall, we find higher rates of 
unionisation and collective bargaining in Angola than 
in Ethiopia, where the workers in the construction 
sector have almost no trade union coverage and the 
manufacturing sector is bifurcated into companies 
with strong links into low-margin global value chains. 
While in Angola the largest differences are found 
between Chinese companies on the one hand, and 
other foreign and Angolan companies on the other, 
in Ethiopia Chinese and other foreign companies 
are quite similar to one another but very different to 
Ethiopian enterprises. Unionisation levels are much 
higher in Ethiopian firms, which are more established 
in the country and are far more accustomed to 
tripartite dialogue than foreign investors.
In Angola we found that average levels of 
unionization were very low, well below 15-20% 
in the construction sector, according to local 
trade union sources. However, our sample of 
Angolan and other foreign firms seemed to have 
more engagement with unions than the average 
and certainly compared to Chinese firms where 
unionization rates are low and closer to the 
national average. Given this lower presence of 
trade unions, the frequency of collective bargaining 
in Chinese firms was higher than expected, but still 
lower than in highly formalized Angolan and other 
foreign firms. 




Strike Collective bargaining Presence of trade union at work 
Figure 15 - Presence of trade union and strikes, Angola (%)
Source: IDCEA survey, 2017
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Chinese managers often argued that the presence 
of trade unions drives conflict. Instead, they prefer 
to resolve tensions by talking directly to employees. 
Our data suggest that the incidence of strikes is 
lower in Chinese firms compared to other companies 
in the same sector. This is unlikely to be related to 
lower unionisation given that trade unions in Angola 
are not particularly active. The incidence of strikes 
is also likely to be associated with the nature of the 
workforce. A more educated, better-off and more 
vocal labour force, as present in non-Chinese firms, 
may be more capable of organising strikes and more 
prone to taking action. 
In Ethiopia, the contrasts between firms in terms 
of attitudes towards workplace organising and 
trade union are somewhat different from Angola. 
The biggest differences occur between Ethiopian 
companies and foreign companies, both Chinese 
and non-Chinese. What sets Ethiopian companies 
apart from both Chinese companies and other 
foreign companies is the much greater prevalence 
of trade unions among Ethiopian companies. These 
differences are driven by the manufacturing sector. 
In the road construction sector, where firms rely on 
a small core of permanent semi-skilled workers and 
large numbers of temporary low-skilled workers, 
unionisation is almost non-existent, regardless of 
company origin.
Among manufacturing workers, 55% of respondents 
in Ethiopian firms report that their workplace has a 
trade union, while only 26% of employees of foreign 
firms and 17% of workers in Chinese companies say 
the same. In part, these differences in unionisation 
rates are due to the fact that Chinese and other 
foreign companies are more likely to be sited in 
one of Ethiopia’s new industrial zones, which were 
established to attract FDI (Weldesilassie et al., 2017). 
While globally there is no systematic evidence 
that companies in industrial parks or other special 
economic zones necessarily have lower rates 
unionisation than companies outside (Cirera and 
Lakshman, 2017), companies in low-skilled labour-
intensive value chains frequently seek out countries 
where labour institutions are weak (Anner, 2015), 
and unions are hardly present in some of Ethiopia’s 
industrial parks. Among manufacturing workers based 
in Ethiopian industrial parks just 13% report that a 
union exists in their company, compared to 56% of 
manufacturing workers outside of industrial parks. 
Our interviews with trade unionists at both national 
and local levels indicate that many foreign companies, 
both Chinese and non-Chinese, are especially hostile 
to the establishment of local union branches. 
Some Chinese and other foreign 
firms seem to consciously discourage 
the formation of labour unions 
because they believe unions will lead 
to escalating conflicts. 
Their preference is to settle disputes through 
direct negotiation with unrepresented workers or 
go to court, especially in the case of construction 
companies. Managers also reported that local labour 
laws and courts tend to overprotect the local workers 
and these firms usually lose lawsuits against the 
workers. Therefore, from the point of view of firms, 
this solution does not seem to help with favourable 
conflict resolution.
Even where labour organisers manage to establish 
union branches at the enterprise level, convincing 
workers of the value of union membership in the face 
of an often hostile management can be a challenge, 
and many workers choose not to become union 
members. Qualitative interviews show that reasons 
range from a lack of knowledge about the role and 
function of trade unions to concerns about ability or 
willingness of union leaders to defend the interests of 
workers. Of all the workers who report having a union 
branch in their enterprise only 49% became union 
members themselves.
Given the low rates of unionisation in the 
manufacturing sector and the near-absence of 
unions in road construction companies, it comes as 
no surprise that we find very low rates of collective 
bargaining between workers and management in 
Ethiopia. Across the entire sample, just 13% of workers 
report that their wages are determined through 
collective bargaining, while 55% say that there is 
no such agreement in place. Interestingly, a large 
proportion of workers, 31%, do not know whether or 
not their wages are determined through collective 
bargaining. One can easily imagine how such a lack of 
understanding can greatly facilitate wage suppression. 
Collective bargaining is low in both the construction 
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and manufacturing, with the share of workers 
reporting such agreements hovering around 8-9% 
in both sectors for Chinese and other foreign  
firms. Workers in Ethiopian firms report higher  
rates of collective bargaining in both sectors, 
with 13% of construction workers and 27% of 
manufacturing workers stating that their wages 
were collectively negotiated. 
The absence of unions and collective bargaining 
arrangements does not, however, imply the 
absence of strike action, which is widespread in 
Ethiopia (Admasie, 2018) and near-universal among 
the firms we sampled. Indeed, strike action was far 
more common in Ethiopia than in Angola, which 
also reflects different work mobilisation cultures 
across countries. Workers in all but two companies 
in our sample reported strike action having taken 
place during their tenure. In the construction 
sector, workers at Ethiopian companies were most 
likely to report having witnessed strike action during 
their tenure, while Chinese companies were the 
least likely. A quarter of employees at Ethiopian 
companies reported work stoppages, compared 
to 15% at other foreign companies and 14% at 
Chinese construction firms. In the manufacturing 
sector the situation is quite different. Here workers 
at Ethiopian companies are the least likely to have 
witnessed a strike, while the employees at other 
foreign companies reported the most strikes. In 
other foreign firms 55% of workers reported strikes, 
compared to 36% in Chinese companies and only 
19% in Ethiopian enterprises. Strikes were more 
likely to occur in industrial parks, where companies 
were universally non-Ethiopian. Inside industrial 
parks 48% of workers reported strikes, but outside 
of parks only 25% did.
Compared to Ethiopia, labour conflict and 
strikes may not be common in Angola but that 
does not mean that labour relations are more 
‘harmonious’. Interviews with managers suggested 
that absenteeism and theft (of equipment, safety 
clothes, money) were common problems. Although 
this was a frequent complaint across firms, Chinese 
managers were more likely to raise it. In part, their 
justification of a ‘dormitory labour regime’ was also 
linked to attempts to minimise such incidents.
8.4.1 Management-worker interactions
Strikes and forms of passive resistance, such as 
absenteeism and theft, are indicators of workplace 
tensions. Across both countries we found evidence 
of conflicts between workers and managers, in 
particular between foreign managers, both Chinese 
and non-Chinese, and local workers. However, while 
in Ethiopia there were large differences across firms 
of different ownership types, we found that in Angola 
firm origin was not a good predictor of conflictual 
relations between workers and management. 
There is evidence of work culture and 
communication clashes in foreign firms, 
including Chinese companies. 
In Ethiopia, workers in Chinese companies appear 
more likely than their counterparts in other foreign-
owned and Ethiopian companies to feel abused by 
managers. In the construction sector, 45% of workers 
in Chinese companies report having suffered verbal 
abuse. The comparable percentages in Ethiopian 
and other foreign-owned firms are 20% and 22% 
respectively. The pattern in the manufacturing 
sector is quite different. Here there is little 
difference between Chinese and other foreign 
companies, but both of these are quite different 
to Ethiopian companies. In Chinese companies 
62% of workers report verbal abuse, as do 58% 
of workers in other foreign companies, but this 
number drops to 35% for Ethiopian companies. 
In qualitative interviews it was suggested that 
perceptions of verbal abuse could be due to 
clashes in communication styles, especially when 
instructions or criticisms were given by supervisors 
and managers. The abrupt style of factory 
managers, whether Chinese or other foreign origin, 
does not necessarily reflect a particular cultural trait, 
but are certainly related to the work cultures of high-
pressure industrial capitalism that have developed 
in parts of Asia (Tang and Eom, 2019). Interestingly, 
Ethiopian workers seemed more sensitive to such 
communication clashes than Angolan workers, who 
did not generally report verbal abuse. However, 
compared to Ethiopia, the work environment in 
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Angolan factories did not seem particularly 
stressful, as building materials factories in Angola 
tend not to set time efficiency targets. 
In Angola, management-worker relations were 
not particularly conflictual in Chinese firms, 
but, as mentioned above, Chinese managers 
frequently complained about the unreliability of 
workers and instances of theft. Safety issues were 
a major concern among Chinese managers, and 
sometimes disgruntled workers were blamed for 
cases of burglary in factories and construction 
sites. Workers did not report many incidences 
of verbal or physical abuses and there were 
no discernible differences across companies. 
Qualitative interviews and life histories, which are 
better suited to eliciting such information, suggest 
abuses did occur but there was no pattern in 
terms of firm origin. However, communication 
barriers between Chinese supervisors and low-
skilled workers led to complaints about Chinese 
‘management style’, even though Angolan workers 
sometimes displayed a similar degree of mistrust 
or disdain vis-à-vis Portuguese managers.
8.5 Training and skill development
Job creation in infrastructure construction and 
in manufacturing contributes to the protracted 
process of building an industrial labour force in a 
country embarking on structural change. Angola 
and Ethiopia are, of course, different in terms of 
their patterns of industrialization and structural 
change, but in both countries jobs in these sectors 
have contributed to skill development that will be 
critical to the prospects for further industrial-led 
economic transformations. Given predominant 
narratives of low workforce localization rates in 
Chinese firms in Africa, discussed in Section 6, there 
is a common perception that Chinese firms do 
not contribute much to skill upgrading of African 
workers. However, our desk review showed that, 
against this frequent perception, all reviewed 
studies give evidence of training provision, even if 
the most dominant forms tend to be informalised 
and on-the-job (McKinsey 2017; Tang 2016; Bashir 
2015). It would be difficult for Chinese firms to 
operate in these new emerging sectors in African 
countries without engaging in some form of 
training, especially considering the lack of skills 
and experience of many of the workers hired by 
these companies, as discussed in Section 7. The 
data collected among workers about their own 
reported experience of training in sampled firms is 
discussed below.
8.5.1 Training provision in Angola
In Angola the picture is mixed and contrasts reflect 
the segmentation of the labour force by sector 
and origin of company and different degrees of 
formalization in labour relations. By contrast, in 
Ethiopia we observe clear differences between 
sectors. This is partly to do with the different nature 
of factory work in Angola (building materials) and the 
labour process there compared to globally integrated 
firms in textile and garment production in Ethiopia. 
In Angola about a third of workers reported having 
received some manner of ‘formal’ training. Employees 
of Angolan and other foreign firms were more likely 
to report having received such training (Figure 16). 
The kind of training they were referring to was a 
formal induction, usually conducted by HR managers 
and H&S officers, which essentially focused on basic 
aspects of health and safety at work and main rules at 
the workplace. This training usually happened at the 
beginning and there was no subsequent continuous 
systematic training. 
Such training does not capture all types of skill 
transfer and development. Despite what is reported 
in Figure 16, most workers at Chinese firms, in both 
sectors, did refer to the importance of skills acquired 
in new jobs in factories and construction sites. This 
was especially the case for the most inexperienced 
workers entering these sectors for the first time. 
Qualitative interviews with Chinese managers 
confirmed that informal mechanisms of continuous 
training were the usual modus operandi. Managers 
placed greater training focus in the initial weeks, so 
that workers could be assigned to specific tasks. 
Once workers were considered ‘reliable’ and less likely 
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to leave, some of them were offered additional 
training for new tasks and the possibility of 
promotion. There was less formality in the delivery 
of such training and less focus on H&S issues. 
Especially on construction sites technical training 
and basic ‘learning by doing and by observing’ was 
the rule. There were some larger companies that 
had invested in vocational training centres, and 
training here included trips to China to give workers 
direct and relevant experience. However, the 
proportion of graduates from these courses who 
eventually worked for the Chinese firm offering this 
training was relatively low, as trainees would often 
look for stable jobs in the Angolan civil service. 
Many Chinese managers in fact complained about 
the high turnover of trainees and its detrimental 
impact on the incentive to formalize and expand 
training for new hired workers.
Overall, training provision varies in 
terms of its degree of ‘formality’, 
how systematic it is and on what 
aspects it is focused. 
Sector matters, not only in terms of contrasts 
between manufacturing and construction, as 
observed in Ethiopia, but also in terms of sub-
sectors and market orientation. Medium-sized 
firms oriented towards domestic market, such as 
many Angolan factories, and globally integrated 
manufacturing companies like in Ethiopia behave 
very differently. In Ethiopia, Chinese firms contribute 
to training at similar rates as other foreign firms 
do, once we consider sector and skill group, but in 
Angola their training mechanisms contrast with the 
more formalized and systematized efforts observed 
in Angolan and other foreign firms.
Figure 16 - Workers having received formal training, by sector and firm ownership, Angola (%)
Source: IDCEA survey, 2017






8.5.2 Training provision in Ethiopia
In Ethiopia, the provision of training differs greatly 
across the construction and manufacturing sectors. 
Figure 17 gives an overview of training provision by 
sector, worker skill level and firm ownership. There 
are two main patterns. First, training provision is much 
higher in the manufacturing sector, where around 
80% of workers report having received training, than 
in the construction sector, where between 20% and 
40% have been trained in their current job. 
The kind of disciplined and tightly organised labour 
process that companies deem necessary to generate 
profits in low-value added sectors such as garments 
and leather products can only be achieved if workers 
fit seamlessly into their production lines and perform 
the required operations quickly and with minimal 
errors. All of which requires training. Some of the 
best examples of systematic and intensive training 
were indeed found in some Chinese firms that were 
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tightly integrated in GPNs. Hundreds of Ethiopian 
workers were sent for several months for ‘deep 
immersion’ in the production operations and 
labour processes of parent Chinese firms with 
the aim of speeding up the process of transition 
of labour practices in Ethiopia-based factories. 
Part of the training in Ethiopian factories focuses 
on ‘soft skills’, such as punctuality, behaviour 
at work, and compliance with targets and 
performance monitoring, but also covers issues 
such as personal hygiene and basic financial 
literacy. Training to improve work discipline and 
efficiency were regarded by managers as critical 
to the production process and required to ease 
the transition from farm to factory for their 
employees. Although this kind of training was 
also practiced in some Angolan factories, it was 
not a significant focus of training efforts.  
In the construction sector in Ethiopia, we found 
that no Chinese company offered systematic 
training for its Ethiopian employees, apart from 
short introductory classes about firm regulations and 
safety practices. Normally the firms let workers 
learn the work skills on the job, by working 
in teams with more experienced workers and 
supervisors. Learning by doing is seen as the 
primary mechanism of skill development. The 
longer the employee stays in the company 
the wider the range of skills developed and 
the greater the opportunities to move up to 
semi-skilled positions of greater technical 
responsibility. There has been a notable 
improvement in the availability of machine 
operators in Ethiopia, significantly more so than 
in Angola. As more and more Ethiopians have 
acquired the licenses needed for driving and 
operating construction machines, Chinese firms 
now mainly hire certified local workers for these 
positions. Generally such semi-skilled workers 
in will be expected to demonstrate their skills 
in a test shift. In Angola, managers are much 
more mistrustful of the skills of licensed machine 
operators and always require both proof on the job 
and additional training before allowing workers to 
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Figure 17 - Provision of any form of training by sector, skill level and firm ownership, Ethiopia (%)
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9 Conclusions and summary 
of main findings  
This project set out to analyse the labour dynamics of 
Chinese firms in sub-Saharan Africa, in sectors that are 
expected to spearhead the structural transformation 
of African economies. China’s well known ‘go out’ 
drive has manifested in a rapid expansion of overseas 
operations of infrastructure builders, mostly SOEs, 
as well as in a dramatic growth in FDI, particularly 
to developing countries. Sub-Saharan Africa is 
an important destination of many of these firms. 
Some countries have received a substantial share 
of Chinese FDI and overseas contracted projects, 
Angola and Ethiopia being two salient examples. This 
has happened at the same time as many countries in 
the region revived their aspirations to transform their 
economies and industrialize. Ethiopia is a leading 
example of that renewed drive. 
The economic and social transformation that is 
often represented by the growth of non-agricultural 
sectors bringing new forms of production, technology 
and new jobs affects the lives of millions of new 
labour market entrants, many of them young, more 
educated than previous generations and eager to find 
new, better paid, and more secure jobs. However, 
employment challenges in Africa remain formidable, 
manifested in pervasive underemployment, high 
youth unemployment and the predominance of low-
remunerated activities, especially in agriculture and 
informal services. The demographic ‘dividend’ is not 
paying off yet. In such a context, the arrival of hundreds 
of new firms seeking to expand infrastructure building, 
general construction services and the manufacturing 
base of countries that have so far failed to industrialize 
is received with some excitement. At the same time, 
as workplace encounters between new investors 
and African workers become more common and 
visible, concerns have been raised about the working 
conditions offered by these new jobs. A relatively 
pessimistic narrative has prevailed in some academic 
circles and especially in media reporting about the 
exploitative conditions facing young African workers in 
new factories and construction sites. 
The main findings of our surveys of more than 1,500 
workers employed by leading domestic and foreign 
firms in Angola and Ethiopia show that the picture 
is more nuanced and diverse than widespread 
perceptions suggest. There is significant variation in 
working conditions between and within countries 
and sectors, especially with regards to wages. Only 
a combination of several factors, including individual 
worker characteristics, sector specificities, local 
context, and a range of firm attributes, including 
the origin of ownership, help us explain some of 
the variation in wages in both countries. Regression 
analysis suggests, for both countries, that the individual 
attributes of workers, firm size, the location of firms 
and skill levels are more important predictors of wage 
levels than the origin of the firm, despite the fact that 
basic descriptive comparisons show lower wages in 
Chinese firms, especially for low-skilled workers. These 
differences are limited and can be largely explained by 
other factors.
Reported wages are not ‘poverty wages’ in the strict 
sense. In Angola and Ethiopia, even the lowest-paid 
low skilled workers receive wages that are above the 
extreme and moderate international poverty lines. In 
Angola, all workers earned wages that were above 
the sector minimum wage and a majority of workers 
earned well above minimum wages. Yet, in both 
Angola and Ethiopia most workers complained that 
these were not ‘living wages’, in the sense that many 
struggled to meet normal monthly expenditures. 
Some workers needed additional sources of income, 
especially in Ethiopia, and as a result some were in 
debt. In Angola an interesting paradox arises: workers 
who receive lower wages but are housed and fed by 
their employers, mostly Chinese firms, managed to 
save a much higher proportion of their salary than 
their counterparts employed by other firms on higher 
wages. Their living costs, especially in a very expensive 
city like Luanda, were high enough to consume their 
wages. Angolan migrant workers residing in company 
dormitories were therefore more likely to be associated 
with the ‘eating bitterness’ metaphor that has often 
been used to characterize the lives of Chinese  
migrant workers. 
The observed differences in wages and working 
conditions, especially in Angola, reflect a striking 
segmentation of the labour force, which is associated 
with firm origin. In Angola we find two distinct 
segments: (a) poorer migrant workers with lower 
education levels and much less relevant sector work 
experience dominate the workforce in many Chinese 
firms in both construction and manufacturing; (b) 
a relatively higher-skilled segment of workers, with 
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education levels above the average urban worker, 
and more work experience in construction and 
manufacturing, who are older and enjoy more stable 
work arrangements, is concentrated in Angolan and 
other foreign firms, especially in Angolan factories in 
Luanda and firms operating in a major dam project. 
These segments reflect the different employment 
dynamics in Chinese firms that on average entered 
the Angolan market only 10 years ago in contrast 
with Angolan and other foreign firms which have 
a more consolidated position in the country. They 
also reflect the reaction of Chinese managers to the 
perceived lack of discipline and reliability of Luanda-
based workers, which encourages them to effectively 
set up a ‘dormitory labour regime’, to improve labour 
control, as it is also common in many parts of China. 
Perhaps more striking is the fact that this kind of 
practice was rare in Ethiopia, where only few Chinese 
firms opt to have worker dormitories, while other 
foreign companies appear to be contemplating this 
option as a way of combatting high labour turnover.
Segmentation among Ethiopian workers has different 
characteristics. Among the low-skilled workers, 
employees of Ethiopian companies are much older 
than workers in Chinese or other foreign-owned 
firms, where workers are very close to one another 
in average age and also have markedly lower levels 
of education. While women form the majority of 
the low-skilled labour force across all company 
types, this is most pronounced in other foreign 
firms, including Chinese firms. Factory work is highly 
gendered in Ethiopia, with dominance of women 
workers especially in textile, garment and shoe 
factories, whereas Angolan factories producing 
building materials are entirely male-dominated. 
Sector and country matter a lot in defining the 
patterns of segmentation. 
Sector specificities and country context are also 
crucial to understand differences in the benefits 
workers obtain, which vary substantially, as well as 
the degree of ‘formality’ in labour arrangements. 
What was common to both countries was the 
absence of labour intermediaries and complex 
labour recruitment systems. Most workers were 
directly employed by the firms in the survey. Their 
labour relation was recognized even if the incidence 
of written contracts was variable and particularly low 
among Chinese firms in Angola. Nonetheless, 
by and large, the terms of contracts were known by 
most workers. 
Finally, survey evidence and selected qualitative 
data show that management-worker relations are 
often fractious in these sectors, but much more so 
in Ethiopia than Angola. While union presence is 
limited, particularly in Chinese firms and especially in 
construction, in both countries, labour conflict occurs 
across sectors and different firms. In the Ethiopian 
manufacturing sector labour strikes have become 
significantly more common in recent years and union 
presence has increased despite some private firms’ 
resistance to unionization and the government’s 
discouragement of unions in industrial parks. Labour 
conflict is not only manifested in strikes and tense 
encounters at the workplace. It is also reflected in 
forms of passive resistance such as absenteeism and 
theft, which was reported to be common in Angola but 
not in Ethiopia. Instances of abuse by managers and 
supervisors, more widely reported in Ethiopia, and poor 
communication, a feature found in both countries, 
reflect some of these workplace struggles. There is 
also a clash of expectations between an emerging 
industrial working class with aspirations of well-paid 
and stable jobs, and new investors in search of a low-
cost and docile labour force. The weakness of labour 
institutions in both Angola and Ethiopia and especially 
the lack of a sector-relevant minimum wage in Ethiopia 
contribute to some of these tensions at the workplace. 
In sum, understanding labour outcomes and 
employment dynamics in the emerging construction 
and manufacturing sectors in African countries requires 
a careful analysis of a multi-layered configuration of 
labour regimes. Outcomes are therefore a function 
of the combination of (a) national level political-
economic and social patterns that shape labour market 
dynamics in each country; (b) sector specificities 
that shape organization of production and labour 
processes, leading to different practices and patterns of 
labour segmentation; and (c) the everyday workplace 
encounters of employers and workers at firm level, 
which depend on a further array of individual worker 
and company attributes of which the origin of the firm 
is only one and not particularly significant on its own.
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OLS regression of monthly wages, Ethiopia
Dependent variable: log of monthly wages (ETB)
  (1) (2) (3)
Individual controls
Individual and firm 
controls
Individual, firm and 
location controls
Respondent’s age 0.00135 0.00115 0.000533
(-0.002) (-0.0016) (-0.0017)
Male 0.0732 0.0885 0.0893
(-0.0382) (-0.0332) (-0.0322)
Migrated 0.158 0.164 0.172
(-0.0358) (-0.0362) (-0.0349)
Years in education 0.014 0.0178 0.0169
(-0.0043) (-0.0044) (-0.0043)
Semi-skilled 0.638 0.636 0.644
(-0.0538) (-0.0507) (-0.0518)
Years in job 0.0133 0.0109 0.00939
(-0.0046) (-0.0046) (-0.0046)
Constuction experience 0.043 0.0439 0.0446
(-0.0141) (-0.0139) (-0.0142)
Manufacturing experience 0.011 0.00993 0.00849
(-0.01) (-0.0093) (-0.0096)
Socio-economic index 0.0436 0.0401 0.0354
(-0.0095) (-0.0085) (-0.0076)




Other foreign -0.0691 0.019
(-0.0663) (-0.0605)




Adjusted R2 0.688 0.698 0.712
F 45.95 45.3 50.34
Observations 817 817 817
Standard errors in parentheses. SEs clustered at firm level. P-values <0.05 in bold.
Appendix B – Regression results
Chinese firms and employment dynamics in Africa: A comparative analysis. IDCEA Research Synthesis Report 71
OLS regression of monthly wages, Angola 
Dependent variable: log of monthly wages (kz)













Variables coef. coef. coef. coef.
semiskilled worker 0.59 0.59 0.56 0.59
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05)
manufacturing sector 0.12
(0.03)
socioeconomic status (index) 0.05
(0.01)
Chinese firm -0.12 -0.08 -0.01 -0.08
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.08)
employment scale (log) 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.03
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
age (log) 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.05
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
schooling years 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
tenure in job (years) 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
construction experience (years) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
manufacturing experience (years) 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
migrant worker 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.07
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
dam worker 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.07
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.11)
core workforce 0.10 0.09 0.10
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05)
constant 9.60 9.74 9.75 9.74
(0.27) (0.25) (0.24) (0.35)
N 625 625 625 625
F 78.8 76.7 76.5 29.3
R2 0.57 0.57 0.59 0.57
Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at firm level. P-values <0.05 marked in bold.

